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NOTE
ON THE ROAD AGAIN:
HOW MUCH MILEAGE IS LEFT ON THE
PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE AND
HOW FAR WILL IT TRAVEL?
Nicole I. Hyland-:
INTRODUCTION
In 1999, the Supreme Court dusted off an old, neglected
constitutional clause, kicked its tires, revved its engine and drove it
onto the constitutional highway for the first time in sixty-four years.'
In Saenz v. Roe, the Supreme Court declared that the right of a
United States citizen to establish residency in a new state and be
treated equally with long-term citizens is a component of the right to
travel that is guaranteed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 2
* J.D. Candidate, 2002 Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Robert Kaczorowski for providing inspiration, encouragement and insight
throughout the Note-writing process. Thanks also to my father, Bruce Hyland, who
cultivated my love for travel, and Shirley Hyland. who proved that it is possible to be
a great mom and a best friend. Thanks to all my friends who have loved me,
supported me and kept me honest.
1. The first and last Supreme Court case to rely on the Privileges or Immunities
Clause was Colgate v. Harvey which struck down a Vermont statute that imposed a
four percent tax on dividends earned on out-of-state investments. 296 U.S. 404, 426
(1935). Colgate was expressly overruled five years later. See Madden v. Kentucky. 309
U.S. 83, 92-93 (1940) (holding that "the right to carn, out an incident to a trade,
business or calling such as the deposit of money in banks is not a privilege of national
citizenship").
2. 526 U.S. 489, 498, 502-03 (1999) (holding unconstitutional a California statute
that limited welfare benefits during recipients' first year of residency to the amount
they would have received in the state where they had previously resided). This Note
refers to the Article IV, Section 2 clause as "the Privileges and Immunities clause"
and the Fourteenth Amendment clause as the "Privileges or Immunities Clause."
The Fourteenth Amendment clause was written in the disjunctive because it was
formulated as a prohibition against government action. while the Article IV provision
was written in the conjunctive because it was formulated as a positive grant of rights.
See Mark Strasser, The Privileges of National Citizenship: On Saenz, Same-Ser
Couples, and the Right to Travel, 52 Rutgers L. Rev. 553.555-56 (2000).
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The Court's reliance on the Privileges or Immunities Clause was
unexpected because the clause has been considered "essentially
moribund" since The Slaughter-House Cases.3 Nevertheless, Saenz is
at least superficially consistent with the Slaughter-House decision,
which identified the right of "a citizen of the United States [to]
become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bond fide residence
therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State" as a
privilege or immunity of United States citizenship.4 Therefore, it is
unlikely that Saenz signals a revolution in the Supreme Court's
Privileges or Immunities jurisprudence.' Nevertheless, it is arguable
that Saenz has, or should have, broader implications for the Privileges
or Immunities Clause.6  Careful analysis of the right to travel
recognized in Saenz reveals some basic inconsistencies between
Justice Miller's formulation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in
Slaughter-House and the Court's application of that clause to the right
to travel in Saenz. These inconsistencies demonstrate that, although
the Court may be reluctant to overturn Slaughter-House, it should
reject Justice Miller's conception of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause as inadequate and impracticable. The Court must adopt a
principled construction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause if it
3. Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 264 (3d Cir. 1990). In Slaughter-House, the
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause only
protected the rights of United States citizens, as opposed to state citizens.
Furthermore, the Court equated state citizenship rights with fundamental rights,
concluding that the clause only guaranteed a limited group of rights conferred by the
federal government. The Slaughter-House Cases 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78-79 (1872).
According to Erwin Chemerinsky, the clause was "rendered a nullity by the
Slaughter-House Cases and it has been ever since." Erwin Chemerinsky,
Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 377 (1997). For more in-depth analyses of
the Slaughter-House Cases, see Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom:
Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 627 (1994); Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or
Immunities Clause and Revising the Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhutming
Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 1 (1996)
[hereinafter Curtis, Resurrecting]; Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting
Incorporationism Straight. A Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 Yale
L.J. 643 (2000).
4. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 80.
5. See Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or
Immunities Revival Portend the Future-or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113
Harv. L. Rev. 110, 197-98 (2000); Bradley A. Meyer, Case Comment, Saenz v. Roe,
526 U.S. 489 (1999), 76 N.D. L. Rev. 427, 448-49 (2000).
6. One commentator argues that the Court's purpose in resurrecting the
Privileges or Immunities Clause was to put to rest the debate over the source of the
right to travel. Jide Nzelibe, Free Movement: A Federalist Reinterpretation, 49 Am. U.
L. Rev. 433, 433-34 (1999). If this is true, the Court may well be jumping out of the
frying pan and into the fire. While the Court has struggled over the years to reach a
consensus on the proper source of the right to travel, resurrecting the Privileges or
Immunities Clause to fulfill that role may lead the Court into the mire of having to
rationalize its resistance to overturning Slaughter-House. Alternatively, it has been
suggested that Saenz reflects an intent to construct a framework for equal citizenship
rather than to locate the source of the right to travel. Tribe, supra note 5, at 154.
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intends to establish the Clause as a legitimate source of constitutional
protection.
This Note argues that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects
certain fundamental rights from state abridgement. These
fundamental rights include the right to travel freely not only to other
states, but also within the borders of a state. The following
hypothetical situations illustrate the intrastate travel issue:
Broadway Baby
Jennifer, an eighteen-year-old aspiring actress from Buffalo, New
York, gets on a bus heading to New York City to pursue her dream of
becoming a Broadway star. Three years later, disillusioned by a failed
career and embittered by a brief but disastrous marriage to a
stagehand named Omar, Jennifer decides to throw in the towel and
return home with her six-month-old son, Ulysses. Unfortunately,
while she was away, Jennifer's mother sold their family home and
moved to a retirement community. Jennifer gets a job at a local fast-
food restaurant and applies for admission to a public housing project.
She is distraught when her application is denied because a city
ordinance7 limits admission to the project to applicants who have
resided in Buffalo for at least five years.
Father Knows Best
Meanwhile, back in New York City, Alisha is supporting herself
and her two-year-old daughter as an administrative assistant while she
pursues her standup career at local comedy clubs. One day she gets a
call from her aging father demanding that she return home to Omaha,
Nebraska where he insists the career opportunities have outstripped
those available to her in New York. Realizing that he has lost his
senses and fearful that senility has begun to set in, Alisha packs her
bags and moves back home to care for him. Unable to find a job and
overwhelmed by mounting medical expenses, Alisha commits her
father to a mental institution and applies for public housing for herself
and her daughter. Unfortunately, her application is denied because of
a state statute that limits public housing to applicants who have
resided in Nebraska for at least five years.
7. As noted, the situations described are hypothetical and are not based on
actual residency requirements in Buffalo or Nebraska. Such restrictions do exist,
however. Cole v. Housing Authority of Newport. 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970). for




In the second case, the durational residency requirement would
almost certainly be an unconstitutional restriction on the right to
travel.' The first case, however, is not so clear. Because Jennifer
moved from New York City to Buffalo, the residency requirement at
most restricted her freedom to move within the state of New York.
While the right to interstate travel has been judicially recognized since
at least 1823,1 circuit courts are split over the existence of a right to
intrastate travel. 0
As discussed above, this Note will argue that the Supreme Court
should recognize a federally protected right to intrastate travel. Part I
discusses the history of the constitutional right to interstate travel.
Part II sets forth the current circuit split over the right to intrastate
travel. Part III discusses the background of the Fourteenth
Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause and concludes that the
clause was intended to protect fundamental rights. Part III also
analyzes the right to intrastate travel as a fundamental right,
ultimately concluding that the right to intrastate travel is best
protected under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE RIGHT To INTERSTATE TRAVEL
It is virtually uncontroverted in American constitutional case law
that the right to interstate travel exists." The case law is much less
8. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 621-22 (1969) (holding
unconstitutional a state statute denying welfare assistance to applicants who have
resided in the state for less than one year).
9. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
(recognizing in dicta the "right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in
any other state" as a privilege and immunity protected under Article IV, Section 2).
10. Compare King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.
1971) (holding that it would be "meaningless to describe the right to travel between
states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a
correlative constitutional right to travel within a state"), with Wardwell v. Board of
Educ., 529 F.2d 625, 627 (6th Cir. 1976) (declining to find federal constitutional
protection for the right to intrastate travel), and Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d
900, 901-02 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding no fundamental constitutional right to intrastate
travel).
11. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) ("The word 'travel' is not found in
the text of the Constitution. Yet the 'constitutional right to travel from one State to
another' is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence.") (quoting United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966)); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254
(1974) ("The right of interstate travel has repeatedly been recognized as a basic
constitutional freedom."); Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629 ("This Court long ago recognized
that the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal
liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and
breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably
burden or restrict this movement."); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966)
("The constitutional right to travel from one State to another, and necessarily to use
the highways and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in doing so, occupies
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clear, however, about where to find the source of this right, how to
define the scope of the right, and how to analyze statutory
impediments to the right. One commentator, after surveying the
Supreme Court's right to travel decisions, concluded:
By the close of the Burger Court... both the Court's doctrinal
approach to the right to travel and the resulting case law were
muddled. Two hundred years of constitutional adjudication made it
clear that a right to travel existed, but beyond that little was known.
The Court failed to define the parameters of the right, identify a
compelling rationale for the right, or resolve the case law in a
coherent and consistent fashion."
Much of the confusion over the right to travel may be attributed to
the Court's failure to distinguish clearly between the "source" of the
right to travel and the basis for constitutional protection of that right. 3
Recognizing and understanding this distinction is essential to
understanding the nature of the right to travel.
The "source" of the right will be used in this Note to refer to the
origin of the right itself. In some cases the source may be a specific
a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has
been firmly established and repeatedly recognized."); Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at
697 ("Although the text of the Constitution does not mention a right to travel, it long
has been recognized by the Supreme Court."); Nzelibe, supra note 6, at 434 ("Despite
its insecure origins, the right to travel never has been questioned seriously.") Gregory
B. Hartch, Comment, Wrong Turns: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Right to Travel
Cases, 21 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 457,458 (1995) (pointing out that "no Supreme Court
justice in American history has voiced opposition to the general concept of a right to
travel").
12. Hartch, supra note 11, at 463.
13. A noteworthy exception to this common oversight was the intrastate travel
case, Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990), in which the court
distinguished between the rights of national citizenship and the protection of those
rights under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Even though the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause
on its face protects such rights against state infringement, the Court has
always viewed the rights themselves as arising independently of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed the doctrine that certain unenumerated
rights are implicit in the concept of national citizenship antedated the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even after its passage, however,
this case line refused to subsume national citizenship rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, holding instead that they "do[] not depend upon
any of the amendments to the Constitution, but arise[] out of the creation
and establishment of the Constitution itself of a national government."
Id. at 263-64 (citations omitted). The court went on to stress the importance of
distinguishing between the creation and the protection of rights:
At first blush, insisting that the rights of national citizenship are protected,
but not created, by the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities
Clause may seem like a quibble, but the distinction has critical doctrinal
ramifications in other contexts. For example, rights created by the
Fourteenth Amendment itself can be infringed only by state actors, while
the rights of national citizenship recognized in this case line may be infringed
by purely private actors as well.
Id. at 264 (citations omitted).
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constitutional provision, while in others it may be a more general
concept. For example, justices frequently ground the right to travel in
the nature of federal sovereignty or the federalist structure. 4 Those
cases may rely, however, on specific constitutional provisions to assert
constitutional protection over the right to travel. Thus, in Shapiro v.
Thompson, the Court viewed the right to travel as deriving from a
combination of federal sovereignty and personal liberty principles,'-
yet it applied an equal protection analysis to determine whether the
right had been infringed.16 In other words, a hybrid conception of
federal sovereignty and personal liberty was the "source" of the right.
The Fourteenth Amendment was not the "source" of the right to
travel, although it did extend federal protection over the right in that
particular case.
In cases where a constitutional provision is considered the "source"
of the right to travel, the same provision has generally also functioned
as the basis for constitutional protection of the right. For example, in
a Supreme Court case that grounded the right to travel in the
Commerce Clause, that clause functioned as both the source of the
right and the basis for constitutional protection over the right.1 7
The importance of maintaining these categories becomes clear
when one begins to analyze the case law regarding the right to travel.
When courts conflate the source of the right and the basis for
constitutional protection of the right, their right to travel analysis
becomes confusing. A prime example of this confusion has been in
the Court's treatment of the right to travel under Article IV, Section
2. In some opinions, Article IV, Section 2 has been identified as the
"source" of the right to travel, while in others, the right to travel has
been treated as an independent fundamental right that is given
constitutional protection by Article IV, Section 2.18 In order to avoid
this confusion, this Note attempts, wherever possible, to identify the
source of the right to travel and to distinguish the source from the
constitutional provision that protects the right to travel in the context
of the specific case.
This distinction is particularly significant in the case of intrastate
travel because, even if there is a fundamental right of intrastate
14. See, e.g., Guest, 383 U.S. at 757 (noting that the right to travel is fundamental
to the Union).
15. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629. See infra Part I.A.3 for a discussion on the
hybrid concept of federal sovereignty and personal liberty as the source of the right to
travel.
16. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638.
17. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S 160, 173 (1941).
18. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 79-80 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the right to travel contained in Article IV of the Articles of
Confederation was carried forward into the Constitution's Article IV Privileges and
Immunities Clause); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No.
3,230) (identifying the right to travel as a fundamental right embraced by the general
description of privileges and immunities).
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movement, it does not automatically follow that the federal
government is empowered to protect that right against state
infringement. A court would still have to identify a constitutional
provision or principle that extended federal protection over the right.
For example, one constitutional scholar explains that constitutional
provisions protecting rights can be either creative or declarative.,
Thus, many of the rights articulated in the Bill of Rights were
declarative, because they were already considered to be fundamental
rights prior to passage of the amendments. ° In addition to declaring
these rights, the Bill of Rights contained prohibitions against their
abridgement by the government.2' Because the Framers considered
fundamental rights to be natural and inherent, they understood the
Constitution merely to provide "security" for rights that already
existed.' Furthermore, certain rights declared in the Constitution
were only protected from abridgement by the federal government.2
Thus, the rights declared in the Bill of Rights were enforceable against
the federal government, but not against the states. It was not that
state citizens did not possess those rights, but that the Constitution did
not provide federal protection against state infringement of those
rights.24 Similarly, even if one acknowledges the existence of a right to
intrastate movement, it does not necessarily follow that federal
constitutional protection exists for that right.
A further source of confusion has been the Court's inability to
define the scope of the right to travel. Although modern Supreme
Court decisions demonstrate that the right encompasses more than
the right to a "change in background scenery,"'  discerning the
contours of the right to travel is difficult, nevertheless. According to
the Supreme Court, the right to travel includes, not only interstate
locomotion, but also a right of interstate travelers to be free of certain
forms of discrimination.26 In addition, the case law has identified the
right to migrate and establish residency in a new state as an aspect of
the right to travel.27 Until recently, this aspect of the right to travel
had been protected primarily under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.' In Saenz v. Roe, however, the Court
19. Curtis, Resurrecting, supra note 3. at 21.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 23.
23. Id at 21-22.
24. See id. at 24.
25. Tribe, supra note 5, at 133.
26. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,500-01 (1999).
27. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618.630-31 (1969).
28. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County. 415 U.S. 250. 253 (1974)
(holding unconstitutional a durational residency requirement for non-emergency
health care); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 (1972) (holding unconstitutional a
durational residency requirement for voter eligibility): Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630-31
(holding unconstitutional a durational residency requirement for welfare benefits).
20011
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
grounded this right in the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship and
Privileges or Immunities Clauses.
29
In Saenz v. Roe, the Court, for the first time, expressly articulated
three components of the right to travel. 0 The first component was the
basic right of physical locomotion- "the right of a citizen of one State
to enter and to leave another State."'" The second component of the
right to travel was the "right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather
than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second
State."3 The Court identified Article IV, Section 2 as the source of
this right.33 The third component was "for those travelers who elect to
become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens
of that State."' As previously noted, the Court identified the source
of this right as the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship and
Privileges or Immunities Clauses.35 This Note will refer to these three
components, respectively, as the right of locomotion, the right of
comity and the right of migration.36
While the framework articulated in Saenz is helpful in clarifying the
rambling definition of the right to travel, uncertainty remains over the
source of the first and most basic component of the right-the right of
locomotion. 37 Because that component was not implicated in Saenz,
the Court asserted that "[f]or the purposes of this case.., we need not
identify the source of that particular right in the text of the
Constitution."38  The Court's failure to identify the source of the
locomotion right is curious for two reasons. First, the Court did
identify Article IV, Section 2 as the source of the comity right, even
though that component was not implicated in Saenz either.3 9 Second,
the right to locomotion, like the right of migration, was identified in
Slaughter-House as a privilege or immunity of United States
29. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502-03; see also Meyer, supra note 5, at 439 (noting that
Justice Stevens "attempted to resolve the confusion surrounding the right to travel by
dividing that right into three components").
30. Nan S. Ellis & Cheryl M. Miller, Welfare Waiting Periods: A Public Policy
Analysis ofSaenz v. Roe, 11 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 343, 347 (2000).
31. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 501.
34. Id. at 500.
35. Id. at 503.
36. See Ellis & Miller, supra note 30, at 347 (referring to the third component as
"the right to interstate migration").
37. See Dan Wolff, Case Comment, Right Road, Wrong Vehicle?: Rethinking
Thirty Years of Right to Travel Doctrine: Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999), 25 U.
Dayton L. Rev. 307, 327 (2000) (noting that "[t]he first component, the right to cross
state borders, has a somewhat elusive constitutional source, and since it was not the
component at issue, the Court did not articulate where it would find the source"), But
see, Tribe, supra note 5, at 126 (asserting that "one may still assume free ingress and
egress are privileges of United States citizens").
38. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501.
39. See Tribe, supra note 5, at 126.
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citizenship.' It seems odd, therefore, that Saenz articulated the more
controversial right of migration as a privilege or immunity of national
citizenship, without acknowledging that the same clause protects the
right of locomotion. Even if, as this Note argues, the locomotion right
is a privilege or immunity of the Fourteenth Amendment, this does
not mean that the Fourteenth Amendment is the "source" of the
right, only that it grants federal protection over the right from state
abridgement. The source of the right would still have to be
identified.4
Because of the persistent uncertainty regarding the source of the
right to travel, this Note attempts to review and analyze the various
sources that have been suggested by justices and commentators,
ultimately concluding that the right to travel is best understood as a
hybrid right comprising both personal liberty and federal sovereignty
principles. This does not mean, however, that the right to travel is less
fundamental than other individual human rights. The fact that the
right is necessary to national unity merely serves to strengthen the
national interest in preserving a right that is also an essential attribute
of freedom.
Historically, the Supreme Court has relied on four "sources" for the
first component of the right to travel. Section A of this part discusses
each of these sources in detail. The four sources are: (1) the
sovereign nature of the federal government; (2) fundamental rights or
personal liberty; (3) a hybrid of federal sovereignty and personal
liberty; and (4) specific constitutional provisions, such as the
Commerce Clause or Article IV, Section 2.
Prior to Saenz, the Supreme Court relied on three constitutional
provisions to provide federal protection over the right to travel.
Section B of this part discusses each of these provisions as they apply
to the right to travel. Because Article IV, Section 2 is treated as both
a source and a basis for federal protection, it is discussed in Part I.A.
The three primary constitutional provisions that the Court has used to
protect the right to travel are: (1) the Privileges and Immunities
provision of Article IV, Section 2; (2) the Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment; and (3) the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally, Section C of this part discusses the Saenz decision and its
use of the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship and Privileges or
Immunities Clauses as the source of the right to travel.
40. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36.79 (1872).
41. This distinction would not necessarily exist for the migration right, which
Slaughter-House specifically identified as being conferred by the Fourteenth
Amendment itself. Id. at 80.
2001]
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A. Sources of the Right to Travel
1. Federal Sovereignty as the Source of the Right to Travel
The federal sovereignty view posits the right to travel as a right
inherent in and essential to the sovereign nature of a national
government." The Articles of Confederation, which predated the
Constitution by nine years, expressly provided that "the people of
each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other
State."43 Somewhat perplexingly, the Framers left this provision out
of the Constitution without comment or explanation." It has been
argued, however, that the right to free ingress and regress was even
more essential to the Union that was fashioned under the Constitution
than to the looser Confederation of states created under the Articles.'5
Because the right to travel grows out of a government need to
maintain a unified nation, the right is perceived only secondarily as a
right of personal liberty. The primary purpose of the right is to
promote the interests of the federal government.46 According to this
view, restrictions by a state on an individual's right to travel could
impede the operations of the federal government by creating
significant barriers to the interactions between a citizen and the
federal government.
An early articulation of the federal sovereignty view is found in
Chief Justice Taney's dissenting opinion in the Passenger Cases.47 He
noted that:
For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was
formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all
citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same
42. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966) ("The constitutional
right to travel.., occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal
Union.").
43. U.S. Articles of Confederation art. IV, § 1, reprinted in Documents of the
Constitution of England and America 109 (1993).
44. Guest, 383 U.S. at 764; Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Three Human Rights in the
Constitution of 1787, at 185-86 (First Kansas Paperback ed. 1968) (1956).
45. For example, in Guest, the majority asserted that "a right so elementary was
conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union
the Constitution created." Guest, 383 U.S. at 758. In addition, Justice Harlan
separately noted that "[iut has been assumed that the clause was dropped because it
was so obviously an essential part of our federal structure that it was necessarily
subsumed under more general clauses of the Constitution." Id. at 764 (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. Id. at 767 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("It is
accordingly apparent that the right to unimpeded interstate travel... was historically
seen as a method of breaking down state provincialism, and facilitating the creation of
a true federal union.").
47. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283,492 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
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community, must have the right to pass and repass through every
part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States.'l
At least one commentator has taken the position that the right to
travel is properly viewed exclusively as a federalist construction, free
from any personal liberty or fundamental rights associations. 9 Jide
Nzelibe points out that early case law located the right to travel in the
policy objective of "conserving the political and economic union
against provincial state interests."'5 At some point along the way,
however, the right to travel doctrine became "mired in the language
of personal rights," and the original federalist theory was replaced
with a personal liberty view." In order to extricate the offending
personal liberty terminology from the right to travel, Nzelibe uses the
term "free movement doctrine" instead of "right to travel."52 Nzelibe
argues that three constitutional limitations on state power-the
Commerce Clause, the free movement doctrine and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2-have a common source:
Article IV of the Articles of Confederation."- All three of these
limitations serve the common purpose of promoting a unified nation.4
Nzelibe asserts that, although the Article IV, Section 2 language
guaranteeing free ingress and regress between the states was excluded
from the Constitution, the free movement principle was incorporated
into Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution "in briefer form but with
no change of substance or intent, unless it was to strengthen the force
of the Clause in fashioning a single nation.""5  Although Nzelibe
perceives the right to travel as a principle based on federalism, he
actually locates its source in Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution,
which he claims incorporates the free movement principle of Article
IV of the Articles of Confederation.56 This Note, on the other hand,
argues that courts relied on federal sovereignty as an independent
source of the right to travel. For example, one of the most explicit
judicial articulations of the federal sovereignty view, found in Justice
Miller's majority opinion in Crandall v. Nevada, makes no mention of
Article IV, Section 2 as the source of the right to travel.'
48. Id.




53. Id at 439.
54. Id. The close connection, in both original source and purpose, between the
two constitutional provisions and the free movement principle has led courts to
identify those provisions as the source of the right to travel, according to Nzibile. Id.
at 440.
55. Id. at 439 (quoting Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 661 (1975)).
56. Id
57. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
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Crandall involved a Nevada statute that imposed a tax of one dollar
on every person leaving the state.58 The Court struck down the statute
on the ground that it infringed the right to travel.5 9 Although a tax of
one dollar may not seem to be a significant burden on interstate
movement, the Court noted that "if the State can tax a railroad
passenger one dollar, it can tax him one thousand dollars. If one State
can do this, so can every other State."' Thus, by imposing such taxes,
''one or more States covering the only practicable routes of travel
from the east to the west, or from the north to the south, may totally
prevent or seriously burden all transportation of passengers from one
part of the country to the other."'"
According to Justice Miller, the right to travel derived from the
relationship between the sovereign national government and its own
citizens.' Thus, the federal government had the right to require its
citizens to come to the capital or to any of its local offices in order to
serve the government.63 Naturally, the federal government's power to
exercise this right could not depend on the largesse of the state
governments.14 Moreover, this power gave rise to a "correlative" right
of the citizen:
[T]o come to the seat of the government to assert any claim he may
have upon that government, or to transact any business he may have
with it. To seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in
administering its functions. He has right to free access to its sea-
ports, through which all the operations of foreign trade and
commerce are conducted, to the sub-treasuries, the land offices, the
revenue offices, and the courts of justice in the several States, and
this right is in its nature independent of the will of any State over
whose soil he must pass in the exercise of it.65
Thus, Justice Miller articulated the right to travel not primarily as a
right of personal liberty but as a right grounded in national
sovereignty.' Nevertheless, the right belongs to the citizen and
appears, even under the federal sovereignty view, to be a broad right
of free movement. Thus, under Justice Miller's analysis, a citizen has
the right to travel anywhere in the nation, within or across the borders
of any state, free from state interference, because he or she may need
to do so in order to fulfill obligations and exercise rights with respect
to the federal government, even if in reality the trip does not implicate
these obligations or rights. In fact, there is no indication that the
58. Id. at 36.
59. Id. at 49.
60. Id. at 46.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 43-44.
63. Id.
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passengers in Crandall were traveling in order to fulfill an obligation
to the federal government or to exercise a right against the federal
government.67
It has been argued that, in the passage quoted above, Justice Miller
was merely providing a list of reasons supporting the right to travel.
Thus, in Edwards v. California, the next major Supreme Court case to
consider the right to travel, Justice Douglas claimed that "[t]he point
which Mr. Justice Miller made was merely in illustration of the
damage and havoc which would ensue if the States had the power to
prevent the free movement of citizens from one State to another."'
Because there was no evidence that the passengers in the Crandall
case were traveling for any federal purpose, Justice Douglas denied
that Justice Miller intended to limit the citizen's right to travel to
purposes deriving from the operations of the federal government.' It
is unlikely, however, that Justice Miller was merely "emphasiz[ing]
that the Nevada statute would obstruct the right of a citizen to travel
to the seat of his national government or its offices throughout the
country" in order to illustrate how state regulation could impede the
functions of the national government. 70 Rather, he argued that the
right to travel itself was routed in the nature of federal sovereignty,
which imposed a duty on citizens to serve the government and gave
them the "correlative" right to approach the government seat.7
According to him, it was out of this right to approach the government
that the right to travel grew.- Consequently, Justice Douglas's
interpretation underplayed the significance of Justice Miller's
observations regarding the nature of the federal government and the
attendant rights and duties of its citizens.
Justice Douglas's mischaracterization of Justice Miller's analysis
was understandable, however, because there appeared to be a gaping
hole in Justice Miller's logic. If the right to travel derived from a
citizen's obligations to the federal government and the related rights
that flowed therefrom, a state would still have the power restrict a
citizen from traveling for purposes that were unrelated to those
federal rights and obligations. Thus, Justice Miller's analysis failed to
provide sufficient support for the extensive right to travel recognized
in Crandall.73
67. The decision did not mention the reason why the travelers were leaving
Nevada, nor did it expressly limit its holding to those traveling for a federal purpose.
68. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S 160, 178 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring).
69. See id. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring) (rejecting the dictum in United States v.
Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 299 (1920), which characterized the statute in Crandall as one
which directly burdened the performance of government functions or the rights
derived from those functions).
70. Id. at 178 (Douglas, J., concurring).
71. See Crandall, 73 U.S. at 43-44.
72. See id.
73. One commentator notes that the federal view "falls far short of justifying the
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Another shortcoming of a pure federal sovereignty view is that a
right that exists primarily to advance federal interests may not be
protected from infringement by the federal government itself. Thus,
the federal government could presumably restrict the right to travel in
the interests of federal sovereignty.74 For example, a federal statute
requiring new state residents to wait six months before applying for
federally funded public assistance might be justified on the ground
that it enables the federal government to plan the distribution of
welfare funds among the states. 5 Under a personal liberty conception
of the right to travel, however, such a provision would likely be
unconstitutional.76
The federal sovereignty view was again invoked in United States v.
Guest, a case involving the prosecutions of private individuals for
conspiracy to interfere with the rights of African-Americans to "use
highway facilities and other instrumentalities of interstate
extremely broad right" recognized by the Supreme Court since the 1960s. Hartch,
supra note 11, at 476. Hartch characterizes the reliance on the federal sovereignty
rationale as "insincere" because "the nation functioned reasonably well for almost
200 years" before the Court began to apply the right to travel to invalidate durational
residency requirements. Id.
74. This point is slightly different from the point made by Jide Nzelibe. Nzelibc
argues that there is no fundamental right to travel, merely a free movement principle,
under which the federal government's power to restrict travel is unconstrained.
Nzelibe, supra note 6, at 465-69. The federal sovereignty view, on the other hand,
argues that the right to travel, although emanating from the federal government,
ultimately gives rise to a fundamental right that is vested in the individual.
Nevertheless, it is still arguable that a right to travel based solely on federal
sovereignty is not protected from federal restriction since the right is defined by the
federal government. Thus, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 667-68 (1969),
Justice Harlan argued that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment would not protect the right to travel from federal abridgement.
According to Justice Harlan:
On the authority of Crandall v. Nevada, those privileges and immunities
have repeatedly been said to include the right to travel from State to State,
presumably for the reason assigned in Crandall: that state restrictions on
travel might interfere with intercourse between the Federal Government
and its citizens. This kind of objection... would seem necessarily to vanish
in the face of congressional authorization, for except in those instances when
its authority is limited by a constitutional provision binding upon it (as the
Fourteenth Amendment is not), Congress has full power to define the
relationship between citizens and the Federal Government.
Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). Presumably the same argument may
be made with respect to the Equal Protection Clause, which the majority relied on to
strike down the statute. Nevertheless, the majority held that Congress had authority
to permit states to violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Id.
at 641.
75. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 641.
76. Because of this limitation inherent in the federal sovereignty view, Justice
Harlan argued that the right to travel should be regarded as a personal liberty
protected by the Due Process Clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 669-77 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, Justice Harlan concluded that the
statute in Shapiro should have been upheld. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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commerce." 77 The Court held that the defendants had been properly
charged because the right to travel was a fundamental right.'M Justice
Stewart, writing for the majority, noted that "[t]he constitutional right
to travel from one State to another, and necessarily to use the
highways and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in doing
so, occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal
Union."79
While the case law clearly establishes that the right to travel is a
central attribute of a strong unified nation, theories that articulate the
right solely or primarily in terms of federal sovereignty miss an
important point. The main reason the right to travel is so essential to
the federal government is because respect for personal liberty is
essential to a strong, unified nation. The right to travel is protected,
not simply because the federal government would not function
without it, but because the federal government would be worthless if
it did not protect the basic liberties of its citizens.
2. Personal Liberty as the Source of the Right to Travel
The personal liberty view places the right to travel squarely within
the ambit of individual civil rights. Thus, the freedom to move from
place to place is an aspect of personal liberty which the government,
be it state or federal, cannot restrict without good reason.'
The personal liberty view conceives of the right to travel as an
individual human right, essential to liberty and human dignity, not
merely as a right deriving from federal citizenship. Although society
may benefit as a whole from recognizing and protecting this
fundamental freedom, the right is vested first and foremost in the
individual, not in the government. For example, in Corfield v. Coryell,
Justice Washington identified the right to travel as a right that was "in
[its] nature, fundamental; which belong[s], of right, to the citizens of
all free governments.,''s Thus, he did not restrict the right to citizens
of a federalist system, but to citizens of all free governments.
Similarly, in Williams v. Fears, Chief Justice Fuller described the
right to travel as an "attribute of personal liberty."' - This personal
liberty right, however, was "secured by the Fourteenth Amendment
and by other provisions of the Constitution."' In other words, the
"source" of the right was personal liberty, while constitutional
protection for that right derived from specific constitutional
77. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 748 n.1 (1966) (quoting the grand jury
indictment).
78. Id. at 757.
79. Id
80. See, e.g., Chafee, supra note 44, at 192-93.
81. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).




provisions. In Edwards v. California, Justice Jackson viewed the right
to travel as a personal liberty, rather than as a right grounded in the
Commerce Clause as the majority held. 84 Thus, Justice Jackson wrote
that "[t]o hold that the measure of [a human being's] rights is the
commerce clause is likely to result eventually either in distorting the
commercial law or in denaturing human rights,"'85 demonstrating his
belief that the right to travel was best understood as a natural human
right.
3. The Hybrid Concept of Federal Sovereignty and Personal Liberty
as the Source of the Right to Travel
The challenge of ascribing the right to travel to any one particular
source has led some justices to conflate the concepts of federal
sovereignty and personal liberty, either inferring or expressly asserting
that the right to travel is dual-faceted.86 Thus, as one commentator
notes:
There is, of course, a middle ground between these two positions-
the doctrine could be both an attribute of our federalist structure in
addition to a fundamental personal right. If there is a unifying
theme to the Court's right to travel jurisprudence, it is Vrobably that
there is this duality of values embodied in this "right."
In Shapiro, for example, Justice Brennan writing for the majority
noted the dual aspect of the right to travel when he observed that:
[L]ong ago [the Supreme Court] recognized that the nature of our
Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty
unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the
length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or
regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.'
Other justices have described the right to travel in terms of both
federal sovereignty and personal liberty. For example, Justice
Stewart, whose opinion in Guest contains one of the strongest judicial
statements of the federal sovereignty view, described the right to
travel in Shapiro as "a virtually unconditional personal right,
guaranteed by the Constitution to us all. '89 The hybrid approach
reflects the recognition that the right to travel cannot be understood
exclusively as a federal sovereignty or personal liberty right.
84. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 182 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
85. Id.
86. See Nzelibe, supra note 6, at 464.
87. Id.
88. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
89. Id. at 643 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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4. Specific Constitutional Provisions as Sources of the Right to
Travel
Although the Articles of Confederation contained a provision
expressly guaranteeing freedom of movement between states, the
Constitution did not include this provision. Specifically, Article IV of
the Articles of Confederation stated:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and
intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union,
the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and
fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of
each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other
State .... 90
Although the first clause of this Article, protecting the privileges
and immunities of citizens, was incorporated into Article IV, Section 2
of the Constitution, the second clause guaranteeing freedom of
movement between the states was not. At least three possible reasons
have been suggested for its exclusion. First, the Framers found it
"objectionable" in some way.91 Second, they believed that the right
was "embodied elsewhere" in the Constitution making its inclusion
"superfluous." 92  Third, they believed that the right was so
fundamental to personal liberty or so basic to the nature of the federal
government that it did not need to be articulated."3  Attempts to
identify a specific constitutional source for the right are based on the
90. U.S. Articles of Confederation art. IV, § 1, reprinted in Documents of the
Constitution of England and America 109 (1993).
91. Chafee, supra note 44, at 185. Chafee rejects this explanation for the clause's
exclusion without detailing what those objections might have been. Gregory Hartch,
on the other hand, adheres to the view that the Framers excluded the right to travel
because they did not believe it to be either a necessary aspect of federalism or a
fundamental personal right. Hartch, supra note 11, at 476. According to Hartch,
"there is no evidence that the Framers regarded the right to travel as a fundamental
right. In fact, if anything, originalist evidence points to jettisoning the right
altogether." Id. Hartch asserts that the Framers omitted the right to travel from the
Constitution because they "did not view the right to travel as vital to the new nation."
Id. This view is not generally accepted by scholars. Thus, as one commentator notes:
[I]t has never been suggested, nor would it be logical to suggest, that the
Framers intended to abolish the right to travel by leaving the "ingress and
regress" clause out of the text of the Constitution. Thus, it is likely that the
right was necessarily intended to have its source somewhere else in the
Constitution.
Meyer, supra note 5, at 431 (footnotes omitted). Similarly, Andrew Porter asserts
that although "lo]ne reading of the change is that travel is no longer an important
constitutional principle," it is "[m]ore likely" that the right to travel was left out
because it was considered such a basic right. Andrew C. Porter, Comment, Toward a
Constitutional Analysis of the Right to Intrastate Travel, 86 Nw. U. L Rev. 820, 822
(1992).
92. Chafee, supra note 44, at 185.
93. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,758 (1966).
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second theory that the right to travel was excluded from the text of
Article IV, Section 2 because it was embodied in some other provision
of the Constitution. The two primary provisions that have been
identified as textual sources for the right to travel are Article IV,
Section 2 itself and the Commerce Clause. Most recently, the
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause has been
identified as a source for one aspect of the right to travel-the right of
migration.94 This third provision will be addressed in Section C of this
part, which discusses Saenz v. Roe. The two primary provisions will
be discussed below.
a. Article IV, Section 2, Privileges and Immunities
One reason offered for the exclusion of express language
guaranteeing the right to travel between the states is that the right was
embodied in the clause that the Framers of the Constitution did retain
from the Articles of Confederation, namely that "[t]he Citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens
in the several States."95
In Paul v. Virginia, for example, Justice Field identified Article IV,
Section 2 as the source of the right to interstate travel.96 Article IV,
Section 2, according to Field:
[P]lace[s] the citizens of each State upon the same footing with
citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from
citizenship in those States are concerned. It relieves them from the
disabilities of alienage in other States; it inhibits discriminating
legislation against them by other States; it gives them the right of free
ingress into other States, and egress from them; it insures to them in
other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those
States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the
pursuit of happiness; and it secures to them in other States the equal
protection of their laws. It has been justly said that no provision in
the Constitution has tended so strongly to constitute the citizens of
the United States one people as this.'
Field appeared to infer from the protections given to non-citizens
within a state the existence of a right of non-citizens to travel to those
states. One problem with this interpretation is that Article IV,
Section 2 is not generally considered by constitutional authorities to
be a rights-creating instrument or even a substantive protection, but
an anti-discrimination provision.98 Thus, in Slaughter-House, Justice
94. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503 (1999).
95. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
96. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868) (upholding a state statute
imposing a tax on out of state insurance corporations on the ground that corporations
are not citizens and are not protected by Article IV, Section 2).
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. See Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 350.
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Miller asserted that Article IV, Section 2 "did not create those rights,
which it called privileges and immunities of citizens of the States." '
Rather, Article IV, Section 2 merely limits the power of a state to
discriminate against citizens of other states with respect to their
privileges and immunities.10 Thus, the privileges and immunities,
whatever they may be, are derived from some other source. '"'  In
addition, treating Article IV, Section 2 as the source of the right to
travel is problematic because Article IV has generally been held to
protect only the rights of non-residents of the state, whereas the right
to travel extends to both residents and non-residents of a state."'-
Thus, even if Article IV protects the right of a non-citizen to enter or
leave a state, it does not address the right of a state citizen to enter or
leave his or her own state. 03 Under the case law, therefore, Article
IV, Section 2, would fail to protect state citizens from restrictions
imposed by their own states on the right to travel."° Furthermore, if a
state restricts the ingress and regress of its own citizens, presumably it
can also limit the movement of non-citizens, since Article IV, Section
2 guarantees to non-citizens only those rights that the state grants to
its own citizens.10 5
99. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,77 (1872).
100. Id. at 77. Justice Miller further explained that the clause did not "profess to
control the power of the State governments over the rights of its own citizens." I.
According to him, the only purpose of the clause:
[Wlas to declare to the several States, that whatever those rights, as you
grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit or qualify, or
impose restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall
be the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your
jurisdiction.
Id. Similarly, in Toomer v. Witsell, the Court asserted that Article IV, Section 2 "was
designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same
privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395
(1948); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 353.
101. See Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 352-56.
102. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 77.
103. See Chafee, supra note 44, at 186; Hartch, supra note 11. at 477.
104. This traditional view of Article IV, Section 2 as protecting only non-residents
has been questioned by some authorities. Professor Mark Strasser asserts that
"[c]ourts and commentators also disagree about... whether it applies when
individuals who are citizens in one state wish to become citizens of a different state or
only when a citizen of one state temporarily visits another state." Strasser, supra note
2, at 558. Justice O'Connor has taken the position that Article IV protects not only
out-of-state visitors, but individuals who venture into a state "to settle there and
establish a home." Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 74 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Thus, Article IV, Section 2 protects state citizens from state
discrimination based on length of residency because such restrictions infringe their
fundamental right to migrate and establish residency in a new state, a privilege and
immunity under Article IV. Id. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist
holds the opposite view that the clause "has no application to a citizen of the State
whose laws are complained of." Id. at 84 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
105. Professor Chafee illustrates this point as follows:
One possible explanation of the omission of ingress and egress... is that
freedom of movement was regarded as part of the "Privileges and
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There appear to be two basic impulses behind decisions favoring
Article IV, Section 2 as the source of the right to travel. First, it
makes some intuitive sense to link the right to travel to the
constitutional provision that parallels its expression in the Articles of
Confederation. 16 Second, an early and influential case, Corfield v.
Coryell,107 has been interpreted as identifying Article IV, Section 2 as
the source of the right to travel. 08 A careful reading of Justice
Washington's opinion in Corfield reveals, however, that the right to
travel, like the other rights he lists, is in fact a right of personal liberty
that exists independently of Article IV, Section 2.109
In a frequently quoted portion of that decision, Justice Washington
posed the question: "[W]hat are the privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several states?"110 He went on to answer the question
by "confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities
which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the
citizens of all free governments." ' Thus, he equated privileges and
immunities with the basic, fundamental rights that belong to free
people. These fundamental rights included "[t]he right of the citizen
of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for
purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise." ' 2
Immunities of Citizens in the several States," which must also be given to
citizens of another state without discrimination. For example, if Rhode
Island allows Rhode Islanders to come in and go out as they please, it cannot
exclude visitors from Massachusetts. Still, suppose Rhode Island law refuses
to readmit any citizen who has been out of the state for over a week. Then
there would be no discrimination in keeping out Massachusetts men who
have never been in Rhode Island at all.
Chafee, supra note 44, at 186.
106. See, e.g., Zobel, 457 U.S. at 78-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Article IV's
Privileges and Immunities Clause has enjoyed a long association with the rights to
travel and migrate interstate."); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 764 (1966)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Because of the close proximity
of the right of ingress and regress to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Articles of Confederation it has long been declared that the right is a privilege and
immunity of national citizenship under the Constitution."). Jide Nzelibe argues that
because the right to travel and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Constitution can both be traced to Article IV of the Articles of Confederation, courts
have often identified the Privileges and Immunities Clause as the source of the right
to travel. Nzelibe, supra note 6, at 436-37. Nzelibe further argues that another reason
courts identified this constitutional provision as the source of the right was because
the "free movement principle" and the Privileges or Immunities Clause were the
product of the same policy objective to promote national unity. Id. at 441.
107. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). Corfield involved a New Jersey
statute, which prohibited the taking of oysters in the waters of New Jersey by citizens
of other states. The court held that the statute did not violate the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV. Id. at 551-52.
108. See Guest, 383 U.S. at 764-65; Nzelibe, supra note 6, at 442.
109. See Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52.
110. Id. at 551.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 552.
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According to Justice Washington, "the enjoyment of [these privileges
and immunities] by the citizens of each state, in every other state, was
manifestly calculated... 'to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship
and intercourse among the people of the different states of the
Union."113
Justice Washington's opinion has been criticized for interpreting the
Privileges and Immunities Clause as a rights-creating provision."' A
more plausible reading of the Corfield passage, however, is that
Article IV, Section 2 did not create these rights, but merely granted
protection to interstate travelers with respect to these rights. Justice
Washington assumed that the states already guaranteed protection for
these rights to their own citizens.' 5 If this assumption is recognized,
then the passage can be understood, not to create rights, but merely to
grant equal protection to non-citizens with respect to those
fundamental rights."6
Justice Washington described privileges and immunities as
fundamental rights belonging to citizens of "all free governments,"'" 7
implying that such rights exist independently of the Constitution and
are grounded in principles of freedom and liberty. In addition, he
listed the right to travel as one of those fundamental rights over which
Article IV, Section 2 granted constitutional protection.", Thus, in
Justice Washington's view, the "source" of the right to travel was not
Article IV, Section 2, but personal liberty." 9
113. Id. (citing the Articles of Confederation art. IV).
114. Nzelibe argues, for example, that:
[I]n Corfield v. Coryell, Circuit Justice Washington attempted to imbue the Article IV
clause with a norm of substantive rights that citizens of all states would enjoy. The
Supreme Court in Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission later rejected that
classification, thereby making clear that the relevant standard tested whether a state
disadvantaged residents relative to non-residents.
Nzelibe, supra note 6, at 442.
115. See Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551 (noting that these rights "have, at all times, been
enjoyed by the citizens of the several states").
116. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Inmunities Clause, 101
Yale L.J. 1385, 1400 n.48 (1992). Harrison notes:
The question whether the Comity Clause is limited to comity has been
disputed by modem commentators. There is also controversy as to which of
these views Justice Washington adopted. I think Justice Washington meant
to embrace the comity reading. First, the point of the invocation of
"fundamental" rights is the distinction between such rights and oysters.
Moreover, Justice Washington seems to have been talking about kinds of
rights when he said that they fall under general categories. Finally, his
explanation that the citizens of each state were to enjoy these privileges in
every other state, combined with his appeal to the interstate harmony
purpose of the provision, reinforces the antidiscrimination reading.
Whatever he may have implied in Corfield, Justice Washington very likely
subscribed at least to the comity reading of the clause.
Id. (citations omitted).
117. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551.
11& Id at 552.
119. See id at 551.
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This idea that the right to travel arises independently of Article IV,
Section 2 is more consistent with the traditional interpretation of the
clause. As previously noted, Article IV, Section 2 is considered
merely to protect existing rights, not to generate or create new
rights.1 20  Thus, authorities that treat Article IV, Section 2 as the
"source" of the right to travel probably misconceive the nature of the
constitutional provision and misinterpret Justice Washington's
Corfield decision. 2
Most recently, the Court has identified Article IV, Section 2 as the
source of the second component of the right to travel-the right of
comity, or the right of visitors to a state to be treated equally with
respect to certain rights.122 Significantly, however, the Court did not
identify Article IV, Section 2 as the source of the right of locomotion
(the first component of the right to travel) and, indeed, declined to
identify any specific source of that right.'m
b. The Commerce Clause
The first Supreme Court case to uphold the right to travel expressly
declined to identify the Commerce Clause as the source of this right.24
Seventy-four years after that decision, however, the Court relied on
the Commerce Clause to strike down a California statute that made it
a crime to knowingly transport indigent non-residents into the state.,2'
In Edwards v. California, Fred Edwards, a California resident, was
arrested under the statute for transporting his wife's indigent brother,
120. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1872) ("The
constitutional provision there alluded to did not create those rights, which it called
privileges and immunities of citizens of the States."); Nzelibe, supra note 6, at 442
("The idea that Article IV could be an independent source of fundamental rights...
was dispensed with early." (citing Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 75)).
121. One Note writer argues, for example, that Justice Washington "intimated that
[Article IV Privileges and Immunities] was a source of fundamental rights," and that
Paul v. Virginia later rejected this view and "redefine[d] the right to interstate travel
as an anti-discrimination right embodied in principles of federalism." Benjamin C.
Sass6, Note, Curfew Laws, Freedom of Movement, and the Rights of Juveniles, 50 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 681, 684-85 (2000). This Note argues, on the other hand, that Justice
Washington did not describe Article IV as the "source" of the right. The Court in
Paul, however, may have misconstrued Justice Washington's opinion when it asserted
that Article IV "gives [citizens] the right of free ingress into other States, and egress
from them." Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868).
122. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,501-02 (1999).
123. Id. at 501.
124. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43 (1868). The majority expressed
doubt as to whether the state border tax violated the Commerce Clause, but noted
that "we do not concede that the question before us is to be determined by [the
Commerce Clause]." Id. In contrast, the concurring opinion by Justice Clifford
asserted that "the act of the State legislature is inconsistent with the power conferred
upon Congress to regulate commerce among the several States, and I think the
judgment of the court should have been placed exclusively upon that ground." Id. at
49 (Clifford, J., concurring).
125. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S 160, 173 (1941).
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Frank Duncan, from Texas to California. 26 Justice Byrnes, writing for
the majority, noted that "the transportation of persons is 'commerce'
within the meaning of [the Commerce Clause]'1 7 and that, therefore,
the direct prohibition on the transportation of indigents constituted
"an unconstitutional barrier to interstate commerce."12
The Commerce Clause analysis raises several significant issues
regarding the nature and the scope of the right to travel. First, if the
right to travel is grounded in the Commerce Clause, then, by
definition, Congress has significant power to regulate and restrict that
right. 129 As one commentator points out, "it seems unwise to base a
fundamental right on the Commerce Clause when the clause itself
permits Congress to restrict travel."'3 Thus, any restriction on the
power of Congress to regulate the right to travel would have to come
from some other constitutional source.
Second, restricting the transportation of another person into a state
is distinct from restricting interstate movement. In the former
situation, the target of the restrictive statute is the person engaged in
interstate commerce, namely the transportater of people, while, in the
latter, the traveler is directly restricted. As Justice Jackson noted in
his concurrence, however, "the migrations of a human being... do
not fit easily into my notions as to what is commerce."' 3 Thus, he
argued that the Commerce Clause was inadequate to encompass the
full "measure" of a human being's right to travel. "- As mentioned
earlier, Jackson feared that characterizing travel as a form of
commerce would lead to the "denaturing [of] human rights."'"3 Like
Justice Jackson, Justice Douglas perceived the right to travel as more
fundamental than the right to engage in unrestricted interstate
commerce.' 34 In contrast to Justice Jackson's personal liberty view,
126. Id. at 170-71.
127. Id. at 172.
128. Id. at 173.
129. According to Justice Harlan in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 666 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting), "[t]he Commerce Clause can be of no assistance [in a case
involving a federal statute], since that clause grants plenary power to Congress."
Nzelibe similarly argues that the Commerce Clause "appl[ies] to state and municipal
decisions that attempt to discriminate against non-residents or interstate commerce.
The federal government is appropriately exempt from these limitations because the
norm underlying these constitutional provisions is to restrict 'state' activities that are
disruptive to our federal structure." Nzelibe, supra note 6, at 465-66.
130. Hartch, supra note 11, at 477. Hartch goes one step further, arguing that "to
the extent that the Interstate Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate travel,
the Constitution actually disavows the notion that the right is an unfettered personal
right." Id. at 476-77.
131. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 182 (Jackson, J.. concurring).
132 Id
133. Id.
134. Id. at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("I am of the opinion that the right of
persons to move freely from State to State occupies a more protected position in our
constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across
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however, Justice Douglas adopted the federal sovereignty
construction, arguing that the right to travel had long been recognized
as basic to the "national character of our Federal government.""'
Despite this subtle difference between Justice Jackson's and Justice
Douglas's concurring opinions, they both agreed that the right to
travel was a fundamental right, regardless of whether its source was
federal sovereignty or personal liberty. They also agreed that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
rather than the Commerce Clause, protected the right to travel. 3 '
The Commerce Clause has, for the most part, lost its popularity with
the Court as a source of the right to travel. 137 Under modern case law,
the right is generally viewed as a fundamental right derived either
from federal sovereignty, personal liberty or a hybrid of these two
sources. 38 The next section discusses these provisions.
Having established the existence of the right to travel, a court's
work has only begun. The court must then analyze the scope of
federal protection over the right. As previously noted, the courts have
identified the following provisions as providing federal protection
over the right to travel: the Due Process Clauses; the Equal
Protection Clause; and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
B. Constitutional Protection of the Right to Travel
1. Due Process
The Court's most ardent advocate of the due process approach was
Justice Harlan, who, in his opinions in Shapiro v. Thompson and
United States v. Guest139, articulated the argument that the right to
state lines.").
135. Id. at 178 (Douglas, J., concurring).
136. The concurring opinions of Justices Jackson and Douglas are discussed further
in Part I.C., dealing with the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities
Clause.
137. See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255,265 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the most
recent case to rely on the Commerce Clause as a source of the right to travel was the
1941 case of Edwards v. California); see also, Karin Fromson Segall, It's Not Black
and White: Spencer v. Casavilla and the Use of The Right of Intrastate Travel in Section
1985(3), 57 Brook. L. Rev. 473, 505 n.183 (1991) (explaining that Lutz rejected the
Commerce Clause as the source of the right of intrastate travel because of "its disuse
as a source" of the right to interstate travel).
138. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999) (relying on the federal
sovereignty language in United States v. Guest to support the existence of the first
component of the right to travel); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972)
(identifying the right to travel as a "fundamental personal right"); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (declining to identify a textual source, but noting
that the nature of the federal union and principles of personal liberty "unite" to
protect the right to travel).
139. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 655 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Guest, 383 U.S. at 762
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travel is a fundamental liberty that should not be denied without due
process of law."4  Justice Harlan cited with approval Professor
Zechariah Chafee's theory that the right to travel should be analyzed
in substantive due process terms.41 Chafee adhered to the personal
liberty view of the right to travel, rejecting federal sovereignty as
inadequate to encompass or protect "one of the most cherished of
human rights."' 42 According to Chafee, the right to travel was one of
the "liberties" which could not "be taken away without due process of
law."'' 43  Drawing on Chafee's analysis, Justice Harlan asserted in
Shapiro that the "freedom to travel is an element of the 'liberty'
secured by [the Due Process] clause.""
The due process approach was applied to the right to travel in
Williams v. Fears, a case involving a Georgia license tax on emigrant
agents.145  The Supreme Court recognized that the "right of
locomotion" was a liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.
6
Nevertheless, it upheld the tax because it affected "the freedom of
egress from the State... only incidentally and remotely."' 47
In Kent v. Dulles'4 and Aptheker v. Secretary of State,'49 the Court
upheld the right to travel under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. These decisions were significant because they
implicated the right to international travel as opposed to interstate
travel and because they were the first limitations on federal power to
restrict the right to travel. 50 Later, the Court retreated from this
expanded view of the right to travel in Zemel v. Rusk, upholding a ban
on travel to Cuba under the rational basis test.'
In recent years, substantive due process analysis has primarily
involved family and procreative issues." Therefore, because the
Court has hesitated to recognize additional rights under the
substantive due process doctrine, it is unclear whether it would apply
substantive due process protection to the right to travel.'
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 669-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting), Guest, 383 U.S. at 769-70
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141. Guest, 383 U.S. at 769-70 (Harlan, I., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
142. Chafee, supra note 44, at 192.
143. Id at 193.
144. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 670 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
145. Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900).
146. Id. at 274.
147. Id
148. 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (invalidating federal passport restrictions).
149. 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964) (invalidating a federal ban on passports to
communists).
150. See Porter, supra note 91, at 825.
151. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Porter, supra note 91, at 825-26.
152. See Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 637-89.
153. Porter, supra note 91, at 850.
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2. Fourteenth Amendment and Equal Protection
The Supreme Court's modern right to travel jurisprudence has
focused primarily on state durational residency requirements or
waiting periods.' T  The Court has considered the validity of state-
imposed waiting periods for welfare benefits, voter eligibility, access
to divorce, and medical benefits.155 These cases generally involve
restrictions on the migration right, or the right to establish residency
in a new state and be treated equally with other state citizens.
156
The leading Supreme Court case analyzing the constitutionality of
waiting periods was Shapiro v. Thompson, a 1969 decision involving
state and District of Columbia statutes that denied welfare benefits to
residents who had resided in the jurisdiction for less than one year. 157
Shapiro was significant because it was the first case to apply equal
protection analysis to classifications that infringed on the right to
travel. 58 According to the Court, the statutes created a classification
based on the length of residency and denied welfare benefits to one of
those classes.159 Under the traditional equal protection analysis, a
classification will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose.160 If, however, the statute singles out a "suspect
class" or infringes a fundamental right, it will be subject to a
heightened standard of review and the government will be required to
show that the classification is necessary to promote a compelling
government interest. 6' The Shapiro Court held the right to travel to
be a fundamental right, drawing primarily on the hybrid view of
federal sovereignty and personal liberty as the source: 62
This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal
Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to
require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and
breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations
which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement. 163
154. See Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 700-01.
155. See Erika K. Nelson, Comment, Unanswered Questions: The Implications of
Saenz v. Roe for Durational Residency Requirements, 49 U. Kan. L. Rev. 193, 196(2000).
156. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,502 (1999).
157. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 621-22 (1969); see Nelson, supra note 155,
at 197; Clark Allen Peterson, Note, The Resurgence of Durational Residence
Requirements for the Receipt of Welfare Funds, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 305, 314 (1993).
158. Nelson, supra note 155, at 197.
159. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627.
160. This level of scrutiny is referred to as the "rational basis test." Chemerinsky,
supra note 3, at 533-34.
161. The Court generally applies strict scrutiny when analyzing classifications based
on race, national origin, alienage and for classifications infringing fundamental rights,
such as the right to vote, access to judicial process and the right to travel. Id. at 417,
533. Strict scrutiny will almost always result in the invalidaton of the law. Id. at 416.
162. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630-31.
163. Id. at 629.
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The Shapiro Court struck down the statutes on several grounds.
First, it held that the express governmental objective to deter the
migration of the poor was "constitutionally impermissible" because it
directly contravened the fundamental right to travel." According to
the Court:
[T]he purpose of deterring the in-migration of indigents cannot
serve as justification for the classification created by the one-year
waiting period, since that purpose is constitutionally impermissible.
If a law has "no other purpose... than to chill the assertion of
constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise
them, then it [is] patently unconstitutional."' 165
The Court also held that two other objectives proffered by the state,
to discourage "those indigents who would enter the State solely to
obtain larger benefits,"'66 and "to distinguish between new and old
residents on the basis of the contribution they have made to the
community through the payment of taxes,"'' 7  were also
constitutionally impermissible.
Four other objectives offered by the government were permissible
according to the Court:6  (1) to plan the welfare budget; (2) to create
an objective test of residency; (3) to minimize fraud in obtaining
welfare payments; and (4) to encourage early entry of new residents
into the work force. 169  Nevertheless, the Court applied the strict
scrutiny standard, holding that the classifications were not "necessary"
to promote the government objectives, even if those objectives were
compelling. 70 According to the Court:
The waiting-period provision denies welfare benefits to otherwise
eligible applicants solely because they have recently moved into the
jurisdiction. But in moving from State to State or to the District of
Columbia appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any
classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right,
unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling government
interest, is unconstitutional.''
164. Id.
165. Id. at 631 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570. 581 (1968)
(alteration in original)).
166. Id. at 631.
167. Id. at 632. The Court's justification for holding this objective to be
impermissible per se is unclear. Apparently, the Court concluded that rewarding past
contributions by distinguishing between short-term and long-term residents created
"invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens." Id. at 633. If so. however, the
Court's holding is conclusory, because it fails to explain why distinctions based on
length of residency are invidious. If, however, the objective of rewarding past
contributions itself was permissible and the classifications were merely suspect, then
the Court should have applied the second prong of the equal protection analysis.
168. Id. at 633-34.
169. Id. at 634.
170. Id. at 634-38.
171. Id. at 634.
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Thus, Shapiro appeared to hold that any classification that deterred
or penalized the right to travel would trigger strict scrutiny.172 Shapiro
did not consider all durational residency requirements to be penalties,
however. 173  For example, certain waiting periods "may promote
compelling state interests on the one hand, or, on the other, may not
be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate
travel."'74  The Court did not explain, however, why the waiting
period involved in Shapiro burdened the right to travel in such a way
as to trigger strict scrutiny, nor did it discuss how to distinguish
between waiting periods that penalize the right to travel and those
that do not.17
5
The Court cleared up one point of confusion in Dunn v. Blumstein,
decided three years after Shapiro.176  Dunn involved a Tennessee
statute requiring potential voters to reside in the state for one year
and in their respective counties for three months. 77 According to
Dunn, a statute need not actually deter individuals from moving to
another state to be considered an unconstitutional restriction on the
right to travel. Thus, a statute that penalizes individuals who have
exercised the right to interstate travel will be subjected to strict
scrutiny even if it has no deterrent effect.17  Accordingly, Dunn
concluded that, by precluding newcomers from exercising the
"fundamental political right" to vote, 179 the statute penalized the right
to travel. 80
In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, the Court further
attempted to clarify its criteria for identifying unconstitutional
restrictions on the right to travel.'8 Maricopa involved an Arizona
statute that required one year's residence in a county in order to
receive county-funded, non-emergency hospitalization or medical
care."8 The appellant had moved into Maricopa County from New
172. Peterson, supra note 157, at 314.
173. Id. at 313-14.
174. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638 n.21.
175. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1974);
Peterson, supra note 157, at 314-15.
176. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Peterson, supra note 157, at 315.
177. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 334.
178. Id. at 339-40.
179. Id. at 336 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)).
180. Id. at 341-42. The Court subsequently qualified its approach to voter
eligibility requirements. One year after Dunn, the Court upheld a 50-day waiting
period to vote in Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973). In addition, in Rosario v.
Rockefeller, the Court upheld a state requirement that, in order to vote in a primary
election, voters must register with their political affiliation thirty days before the prior
general election. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973). The registration
requirement was upheld even though it imposed a de facto one-year residency
requirement. See Nelson, supra note 155, at 200.
181. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Peterson, supra
note 157, at 316.
182. Maricopa, 415 U.S. at 251.
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Mexico, thus implicating the right to interstate-as opposed to
intrastate-travel."l The Court noted that while Shapiro did not hold
all durational residency requirements to be unconstitutional, it failed
to clarify the level of impact a waiting period must have in order to
trigger strict scrutiny.1m According to Maricopa, however, Shapiro
articulated two factors to consider in determining the level of impact:
1) whether the residency requirement deterred migration; or 2)
whether and to what extent the requirement penalized the right to
travel. 115
The Maricopa Court further explained that "Shapiro and Dunn
stand for the proposition that a classification which 'operates to
penalize those persons... who have exercised their constitutional
right of interstate migration,' must be justified by a compelling state
interest."1" According to Maricopa, the Shapiro classification
penalized the right to travel, not because it was a residency
requirement per se, but because it denied residents "the basic
'necessities of life."'' t Furthermore, the Dunn classification penalized
the right to travel because it denied "a fundamental political right.""l
Thus, under the Shapiro-Dunn-Maricopa formulation, a durational
residency requirement is apparently subject to strict scrutiny if it
penalizes the right to travel either by denying a basic necessity of life
or depriving the traveler of another fundamental right." The
Maricopa Court held that, because medical care was "as much 'a basic
necessity of life' to an indigent as welfare assistance,"', the residency
requirement "penalize[d] indigents for exercising their right to
migrate to and settle in that State."' 9' Moreover, none of the
objectives articulated by the County-preserving the "fiscal integrity"
of the medical care system,192 rewarding past contributions of long-
term residents, 193 developing modem medical facilities,"M determining
bona fide residence,19 5 preventing fraud,'" and establishing budget
predictability 1 -were found to withstand strict scrutiny!"
183. Id
184. Id. at 256-57 ("The amount of impact required to give rise to the compelling-
state-interest test was not made clear.").
185. Id
186. Id. at 258 (citation omitted).
187. Id. at 259.
188. Id. (citation omitted).
189. See Meyer, supra note 5, at 437; Porter, supra note 91, at 828; Ellis & Miller,
supra note 30, at 345-46.
190. Maricopa, 415 U.S. at 259.
191. Id. at 261-62.
192. Id. at 263.
193. Id. at 266.
194. See id.
195. Id. at 267.
196. Id. at 268.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 269 ("Such a classification can only be sustained on a showing of a
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In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for
extending the scope of the right to travel beyond its historical
parameters.199 Under Crandall, for example, the right to travel merely
encompassed movement across the borders of the state, not the "right
to free benefits from every State through which the traveler might
pass.""' Under Edwards, it protected the right of an indigent person
to enter the state without being criminally penalized. 20' According to
Justice Rehnquist, the traditional right to travel was a right to be free
from "effective and purposeful" barriers to migration102 Thus, Justice
Rehnquist proposed that the standard for identifying an infringement
on the right to travel should be "whether the challenged requirement
erects a real and purposeful barrier to movement, or the threat of such
a barrier, or whether the effects on travel, viewed realistically, are
merely incidental and remote. '23 Under this test, according to Justice
Rehnquist, the residency requirement in Maricopa was not a threat to
interstate travel and should have been analyzed (and upheld) under
the rational relationship standard of review. 2 4
Justice Rehnquist rejected as ahistorical the majority's conception
of the right to travel as embodying a right to migrate and settle in a
new state.20 5 Some of the earliest cases, however, identify a right to
settle in a new state and be treated equally with other state citizens.
For example, in the 1823 case of Corfield v. Coryell, Justice
Washington noted that the "right of a citizen of one state to pass
through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade,
agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise" was a privilege and
immunity under Article IV, Section 2.20  Similarly, in Slaughter-
House, Justice Miller stated that a citizen can "become a citizen of any
State of the Union by a bond fide residence therein, with the same
rights as other citizens of that State. ' '2°7 Thus, the Supreme Court's
more recent focus on the constitutionality of durational residency
requirements is not necessarily inconsistent with the Court's
traditional understanding of the right to travel.
Not all durational residency requirements penalize the right to
travel, according to the Supreme Court. For example, the Court
upheld a state-mandated waiting period to obtain a divorce in Sosna v.
compelling state interest. Appellees have not met their heavy burden of justification,
or demonstrated that the State, in pursuing legitimate objectives, has chosen means
which do not unnecessarily impinge on constitutionally protected interests.").
199. See id. at 280-83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 281 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 282 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 283 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 285 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 288 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
205. See Peterson, supra note 157, at 318.
206. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
207. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80 (1872). Justice Miller
did not expressly describe this right as a "right to travel."
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Iowa.21 The Court distinguished Sosna from the Shapiro-Dunn-
Maricopa triad on the ground that regulation of domestic relations fell
exclusively under the power of the states.' Sosna also added a
requirement to the Shapiro-Dunn-Maricopa test; namely, that, in
order to be considered a penalty on the right to travel, the state
restriction must "irretrievably foreclosef." the individual's right to
receive the restricted benefit.10 Sosna has been criticized as being
unprincipled and inconsistent with the Court's prior right to travel
holdings. Chemerinsky notes, for example, that the distinction based
on the argument that the individual "would eventually qualify" for a
divorce "seems questionable because all people precluded by a
durational residency requirement will 'evenually qualify."'12 I Thus:
Those denied welfare benefits in Shapiro or medical care in
Maricopa Cownty ultimately could obtain the same benefits after
waiting for a year. It is not clear why the ability to wait for divorce
makes that durational residency requirement permissible, but
waiting for welfare or medical care is an impermissible durational
residency requirement.
One commentator argues that, in reality, the Court was concerned
with the "seriousness of the deprivation" rather than whether the
individual was "irretrievably foreclosed. 21 3  Thus, the Court was
willing to uphold a waiting period restricting access to divorce but not
to welfare benefits, medical care or the right to vote.1
The Court has also applied equal protection analysis to invalidate
laws that provide unequal benefits to individuals based on their length
of residency.215 For example, in Zobel v. Williams, the Court struck
down an Alaska statute providing for dividend payments from a state
oil fund to state citizens based on previous years of residence in the
state. 16 Chief Justice Burger declined to analyze the case as a right to
travel issue, arguing that "right to travel analysis refers to little more
than a particular application of equal protection analysis. 2 1' Thus, in
determining whether the statute violated the equal protection of
short-term residents, he claimed to apply the rational basis standard of
review rather than the strict scrutiny standard that the Court generally
applies when fundamental rights are implicated by a government
classification.218 He explained that the classifications created by the
208. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
209. Id. at 404-06; Peterson, supra note 157, at 319-20.
210. Peterson, supra note 157, at 320.
211. Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 703.
212 Id.
213. Peterson, supra note 157, at 320-21.
214. See id.
215. Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 703-04; Nelson, supra note 155, at 202.
216. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55,56 (1982).
217. Id. at 60 n.6.
218. See id. at 60-61.
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Alaska statute did not restrict the right to travel because they did "not
discriminate only against those who have recently exercised the right
to travel ... [but] also ... among long-time residents and even native-
born residents. 21
9
Although Chief Justice Burger did not make this point directly, his
analysis would also have been constrained by the Shapiro-Dunn-
Maricopa test, which limited strict scrutiny review to durational
requirements that deprive individuals of either a necessity of life or a
fundamental right. 20 Nevertheless, the opinion is confusing because,
even though he asserted that the right to travel was not implicated, he
relied on language from other right to travel cases to support his
decision.22' For example, the Court held that one of Alaska's
objectives, "to reward citizens for past contributions," was not a
legitimate state purpose, relying on Shapiro's rejection of the "past
contributions" argument.'m Nevertheless, as Professor Tribe points
out, "[a]lthough the majority [in Zobel]... asserted that Shapiro had
already established the constitutional illegitimacy of that state
purpose, it seems plain that Shapiro had done no such thing. 21
Shapiro held, in fact, that it was impermissible to reward past
contributions by creating an "invidious distinction." ' 4  Thus, the
Shapiro Court objected, not to rewarding past contributions per se,
but to doing so by creating a classification that infringed on the
fundamental right to travel.' Alaska's two other objectives-(1)
creating a financial incentive for people to move to Alaska, and (2)
encouraging prudent management of the mineral income fund-were
not rationally related to Alaska's system of classifications based on
length of residence, according to the Zobel Court.2 6
219. Id. at 59 n.5.
220. Chief Justice Burger did point out that, if the Alaska classifications were valid,
states would only be prohibited from apportioning benefits when such apportionment
"involves 'fundamental rights' and services deemed to involve 'basic necessities of
life."' Id. at 64 n.11 (citing Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259
(1974)).
221. Justice Rehnquist points out this inconsistency in his dissent. Id. at 83
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 63.
223. Tribe, supra note 5, at 145 (footnote omitted).
224. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632-33 (1969).
225. Justice O'Connor made this point in her concurring opinion in Zobel when she
noted that:
The Court's reluctance to rely explicitly on a right to travel is odd, because
its holding depends on the assumption that Alaska's desire "to reward
citizens for past contributions ... is not a legitimate state purpose." Nothing
in the Equal Protection Clause itself, however, declares this objective
illegitimate. Instead, as a full reading of Shapiro v. Thompson and Vlandis v.
Kline reveals, the Court has rejected this objective only when its
implementation would abridge an interest in interstate travel or migration.
Zobel, 457 U.S. at 72 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
226. Id. at 61. The Court's main objection to the statute was its retrospective
application. The statute provided for dividend payments for the twenty-one years
[Vol. 70
ON THE ROAD AGAIN
It appears that the Court's real concern was that states would start
apportioning state services and benefits according to arbitrary
classifications based on length of residency, -7 although the majority
asserted that such classifications did not necessarily infringe on the
fundamental right to travel.2-  Thus, according to the Court, a statute
that provides a benefit that increases in proportion to one's length of
residency does not necessarily burden the right of a citizen to move
into a new state. In fact, it may arguably provide an incentive to move
to that state if the benefit is not provided elsewhere, as in the Alaska
case. 229  Nevertheless, the Court was uncomfortable with the
provision, not because it impacted the right to travel, but because it
treated groups of people differently in the apportionment of
benefits.2 °  The Court was apparently concerned with the
consequences of holding such a provision constitutional:
prior to the enactment of the statute. According to the Court, this provision was not
rationally related to the first objective, providing an incentive for people to move into
the state:
Assuming, arguendo, that granting increased dividend benefits for each year
of continued Alaska residence might give some residents an incentive to stay
in the State... the State's interest is not in any way served by granting
greater dividends to persons for their residency during the 21 years prior to
the enactment.
Id. at 62. Under the rational relationship test, however, a statute will be upheld unless
it serves no "conceivable legitimate purpose or... is not a reasonable way to attain
the end." Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 415. It is difficult to see why a statute that
gives long-term residents extra dividend payments to cover past years of residence, in
addition to providing payments for each year of continued residence, is so arbitrary
and unrelated to the stated objective that it cannot survive rational basis review. The
Court had a similar objection to the state's second objective to encourage prudent
management of the fund:
Even if we assume that the state interest is served by increasing the dividend
for each year of residency beginning with the date of enactment, is it
rationally served by granting greater dividends in varying amounts to those
who resided in Alaska during the 21 years prior to enactment? We think
not.
Zobel, 457 U.S. at 63. Whether the Court "thinks" the objective is well-served by the
enactment, however, is not generally considered relevant under the rational basis test.
The Court is usually highly deferential to the legislature's determination.
Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 415. In Zobel, the Court took an activist approach that
is uncharacteristic of rational basis review. As Professor Tribe notes, the Court
engaged "in heightened scrutiny under the pretense that [it was] merely enforcing a
rule of minimum rationality." Tribe, supra note 5, at 145. Justice Rehnquist, in
dissent, criticized the majority for invalidating a state economic regulation which,
under the Fourteenth Amendment, would be presumptively valid and which,
according to the majority's own analysis did not implicate the fundamental right to
travel. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 81-82. The Court also applied the rational basis test in
Hooper v. Bernalillo Cowuy Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985), to strike down a property
tax exemption for Vietnam veterans who had established state residency prior to a
particular date. Id. at 623.
227. See Tribe, supra note 5. at 145-46.
228. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 59 n.5.
229. Id. at 83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
230. Id at 64.
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If the states can make the amount of a cash dividend depend on
length of residence, what would preclude varying university tuition
on a sliding scale based on years of residence - or even limiting
access to finite public facilities, eligibility for student loans, for civil
service jobs, or for government contracts by length of domicile?
Could states impose different taxes based on length of residence?
Alaska's reasoning could open the door to state apportionment of
other rights, benefits, and services according to length of residency.
It would permit the states to divide citizens into expanding numbers
of permanent classes. Such a result would be clearly
impermissible.23'
The Court's conclusion here begs the question: Why would these
classifications based on length of residency be impermissible?
Clearly, in the quoted passage, the Court did not claim that they were
impermissible because they were not rationally related to a legitimate
government objective. In fact, the Court did not even discuss the
possible objectives behind such hypothetical classifications, implying
that the classifications were impermissible per se. It is unclear,
however, why the classifications were impermissible if not because
they infringed on a fundamental right to move freely between states
without being subjected to discriminatory treatment. 32
The Court's right to travel analysis under the Equal Protection
Clause left much to be desired in the way of clarity and doctrinal
consistency.33 By the time Saenz had made its way to the Supreme
Court, the Court had yet to conclusively settle on a source of the right
to travel, clearly define the scope of the right and articulate a
consistent test for identifying unconstitutional restrictions on the
right.34
C. The Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause as
the Source of the Right to Travel
After Shapiro, state welfare waiting periods became obsolete until
the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("PRWORA"), which authorized states to
231. Id. (footnotes omitted).
232. Professor Tribe suggests that Zobel analyzed the classifications as suspect
classes. Tribe argues that "the Zobel Court would have done far better to explain
forthrightly that it was treating the state's legal stratification of its citizenry into
classes based on a factor like duration of residency as constitutionally suspect and, if
not per se invalid, then nearly so." Tribe, supra note 5, at 145-46. According to Tribe,
Zobel is an example of the Court's modern preference for viewing civil rights in terms
of structural federalism rather than personal liberty. Id. at 140. This trend was further
exposed in the Saenz decision, which "reflected the Court's vision of governmental
design in a federal union of equal states, and not primarily the Court's perception of a
personal right ineluctably flowing from constitutional text or deeply rooted tradition."
Id. at 154.
233. See Ellis & Miller, supra note 30, at 345.
234. Id. at 344.
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enact durational residency requirements. 5  In Saenz v. Roe, the
plaintiffs challenged a California statute that limited the welfare
benefits of individuals who had resided in the state for less than
twelve months to the amounts available to them in their previous
states of residence.23 6  In addition, plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of PRWORA's authorization for the statute-l In
Saenz, the Court invalidated the state statute, as well as the
PRWORA authorization, on the ground that the waiting periods
violated the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3
Saenz was the first Supreme Court decision to uphold the right to
travel under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Prior to Saenz,
however, individual Supreme Court justices had argued that the right
to travel should be protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Suprisingly, the first judicial expression of this view appears in the
case that is now famous for decimating the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. In The Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Miller identified the
right to travel as a privilege or immunity of national citizenship. "
In addition to recognizing the right to interstate movement, Justice
Miller further stated that the Fourteenth Amendment itself conferred
an additional right of national citizenship: the right to "become a
citizen of any State of the Union by a bond fide residence therein, with
the same rights as other citizens of that State."' Although he did not
identify this right as an aspect of the "right to travel," it was
subsequently identified as such in Saenz.241
In Edwards v. California, four concurring justices agreed that a
statute criminalizing the transportation of indigents across state lines
violated the right to travel, but declined to ground the right in the
Commerce Clause as the majority did. 42  Rather, the concurring
opinions argued that the statute violated the privileges or immunities
of United States Citizens.243 According to Justice Douglas, "when the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, it had been squarely
and authoritatively settled that the right to move freely from State to
State was a right of national citizenship. As such it was protected by
235. Id. at 347.
236. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,492 (1999).
237. Ellis & Miller, supra note 30, at 347.
238. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
239. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872).
240. Id. at 80.
241. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502-03.
242. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). The majority invalidated the
statute on the ground that it imposed "an unconstitutional burden upon interstate
commerce." Id. at 177.
243. Id. at 181 (Douglas, J., concurring); Id. at 185-86 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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the privileges [or] immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
against state interference. ' 244
In addition, Justice Jackson noted that the Court "has always
hesitated to give any real meaning to the privileges [or] immunities
clause lest it improvidently give too much. '245 According to Justice
Jackson, the Supreme Court:
[S]hould... hold squarely that it is a privilege of citizenship of the
United States, protected from state abridgment, to enter any state of
the Union, either for temporary sojourn or for establishment of
permanent residence therein and for gaining resultant citizenship
thereof. If national citizenship means less than this, it means
nothing.246
When the Supreme Court finally answered his plea, it did so only in
part. In Saenz v. Roe, the Court identified the right to migrate and
establish residency in a new state as a privilege or immunity of
national citizenship.247 The Court did not hold, however, that the right
of interstate locomotion, the first and most basic component of the
right to travel, was protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 4  As previously noted, Saenz
involved a California durational residency requirement that had been
authorized by Congress.249 California justified the waiting period
solely on budgetary grounds, arguing that the provision would save
the state $10.9 million per year." The state denied that its purpose
was to deter welfare recipients from moving to California in order to
obtain higher welfare benefits.251 California argued that, under the
Shapiro-Dunn-Maricopa formulation, the statute did not penalize the
right to travel because new residents would receive the same benefits
as in their prior state of residency."2 Although these benefits were
generally lower than California's welfare benefits, the state argued
that the statute did not constitute a penalty because the migrants were
still in the same financial position as they were before they moved.z3
Moreover, California asserted that the statute was permissible under
rational basis review as an "appropriate exercise of budgetary
authority." 4
244. Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring) (pointing out the previous
acknowledgement of this right by Justice Miller in Crandall and Chief Justice Taney
in the Passenger Cases).
245. Id. at 183 (Jackson, J., concurring).
246. Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
247. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-03 (1999).
248. Id. at 501.
249. Id. at 495.
250. Id. at 497.
251. Id. at 506.
252. Id. at 497.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 497, 499-500.
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The Court agreed with California that the statute did not "directly
impair the exercise of the right to free interstate movement."2 " This
right of locomotion, however, was only the first of three separate
components of the right to travel.- The second component was the
comity right, or the right of "a citizen of one State who travels in other
States, intending to return home at the end of his journey.., to enjoy
the 'Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States' that he
visits." This second component was protected by Article IV,
Section 2 of the Constitution, according to the Court. "  The third
component, which was at issue in Saenz, was the "right of the newly
arrived citizen to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other
citizens of the same State." 9 According to the Court, this right of
migration "is protected not only by the new arrival's status as a state
citizen, but also by her status as a citizen of the United States.""' It is
not clear how the migration right was protected by the "new arrival's
status as a state citizen."'" Perhaps the Court believed that the
migration right was already protected by Article IV, Section 2.
Nevertheless, it held the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship and
Privileges or Immunities Clauses to be an "additional source of
protection" for this right.' The Court noted that, in Slaughter-House,
Justice Miller "explained that one of the privileges conferred by this
Clause 'is that a citizen of the United States can, of his own volition,
become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bond fide residence
therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State."' -
The Saenz Court appeared to apply strict scrutiny to strike down
the statute, noting that "[t]he appropriate standard may be more
categorical than that articulated in Shapiro... but it is surely no less
strict." 61 In addition, the Court adopted an Equal Protection-style
analysis, asserting that the statute created "discriminatory
classifications" which penalized the right to travel because "the right
255. Id. at 501.
256. Id. at 500-01.
257. Id at 501.
258. Id. The Court noted that this protection is not "absolute," but that Article IV
"does bar discrimination against citizens of other States where there is no substantial
reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other
States." Id. At 502 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948)).
259. Id at 502.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 502-03. The Court asserted that in spite of the varying interpretations of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause "it has always been common ground that this
Clause protects the third component of the right to travel." Id. at 503 (citations
omitted).
263. Id. at 503 (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80
(1872)).
264. Id at 504.
2001]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
to travel embraces the citizen's right to be treated equally in her new
State of residence. 265
The Court also struck down the congressional authorization for the
durational residency requirements, holding, as it did in Shapiro, that
Congress may not authorize states to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.2" According to Saenz, "the protection afforded to the
citizen by the Citizenship Clause of [the Fourteenth] Amendment is a
limitation on the powers of the National Government as well as the
States.
267
It is important to note that the right to travel was not penalized
because it deterred migration or because it denied a necessity of life
(as the Shapiro-Dunn-Maricopa test required), but simply because it
discriminated between citizens based on their length of residence.2"
As the Court noted, "since the right to travel embraces the citizen's
right to be treated equally in her new State of residence, the
discriminatory classification is itself a penalty. ' 269  Thus, the Saenz
Court recognized both a substantive and equality-based aspect to the
migration right.27 The substantive aspect protected the right of a
United States citizen to establish residency in a state, while the
equality-based aspect protected the new state resident from
discriminatory treatment by the state. It seems, therefore, that the
Court understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause to incorporate
265. Id. at 505. According to the Court, California's fiscal objective was legitimate,
but its discriminatory method of accomplishing that objective was not. Id. at 506-07.
The Court further noted that the purpose of deterring welfare recipients would be
impermissible. Id. For an analysis of the theory that states providing higher welfare
benefits operate as "Welfare Magnets" for the indigent, see Shauhin A. Talesh, Note,
Welfare Migration to Capture Higher Benefits: Fact or Fiction?, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 675
(2000) (arguing that higher welfare benefits do not create an incentive for people to
move). The Court's application of equal protection analysis to the Privileges or
Immunities Clause has further obfuscated its right to travel analysis. Instead, the
Court should have articulated a distinct framework for analyzing privileges or
immunities. See Ellis & Miller, supra note 30, at 347; Tim A. Lemper, The Promise
and Perils of "Privileges or Immunities". Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999), 23
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 295, 304 (1999).
266. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 507-08.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 515 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist explains that
the Saenz decision abandoned the "effort to define what residence requirements
deprive individuals of 'important rights and benefits' or 'penalize' the right to travel."'
Id. But see Nelson, supra note 155, at 219 (arguing that Saenz did not eliminate the
requirement that the restriction must impact fundamental rights or basic necessities of
life in order to trigger strict scrutiny).
269. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505 (emphasis added).
270. Justice Miller, in his Slaughter-House opinion, also identified this right to
equal treatment between state citizens as one of the rights of national citizenship
recognized by the Fourteenth Amendment and given protection from state
abridgement by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of that same amendment. The
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80 (1873). Unfortunately, Justice
Miller did not explain how the Fourteenth Amendment conferred the right to equal
protection between state citizens, nor did he define the scope of that protection.
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an anti-discrimination principle.27' The substantive right of a United
States citizen to establish residency in a state would appear to be
protected by the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is unclear, however, what the source of the anti-discrimination
principle is. Neither the Citizenship Clause nor the Privileges or
Immunities Clause expressly articulates an anti-discrimination
principle. Thus, the text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
appears to prohibit states from abridging substantive rights, rather
than to protect against discrimination:2n
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to an), person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.27"
There are at least two possible textual justifications for the Court's
articulation of the right to travel as an equality-based privilege or
immunity. One is that the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship
Clause includes an equal protection guarantee for state citizens. An
alternative explanation is that the Article IV, Section 2 Privileges and
Immunities Clause embodies an anti-discrimination principle that was
later incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or
Immunities Clause. Either assumption is inherently problematic,
however, in light of the Slaughter-House rationale. First, if the right to
citizenship conferred by the Citizenship Clause includes the right to
be treated equally with other state citizens, why should this equal
protection guarantee be limited to rights between old and new
residents? Why would the Citizenship Clause not protect each state
citizen from every type of discriminatory treatment with respect to
other citizens? In fact, Justice Bradley takes this position in his
Slaughter-House dissent. The following portion of Justice Bradley's
opinion was quoted by the Saenz Court to support the existence of the
right to equal treatment between state citizens based on length of
residency:
271. See Lemper, supra note 265, at 304.
272. John Harrison points out that there are two types of constitutional limitations:
substantive protections and equality-based protections. "A substantive protection
either prescribes or forbids a certain content of state law. An equality-based
protection, by contrast, says nothing about the substance of the state's law; it instead
requires that the law, whatever it is, be the same for all citizens." Harrison, supra note
116, at 1387-88. Harrison argues that the Privileges or Immunities Clause is actually
an equality-based protection and that "[tjhe main point of the clause is to require that
every state give the same privileges or immunities of state citizenship - the same
positive law rights of property, contract, and so forth - to all of its citizens." i. at
1388. Harrison admits, however, that his theory is unconventional and conflicts with
the traditional view of the clause. Id. at 1389.
273. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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A citizen of the United States has a perfect constitutional right to go
to and reside in any State he chooses, and to claim citizenship
therein, and an equality of rights with every other citizen; and the
whole power of the nation is pledged to sustain him in that right.274
Justice Bradley, however, did not limit this equality to classifications
based on length of residency, but argued that full equal rights
belonged to every citizen. Thus, in a passage of the opinion not
quoted by the Saenz Court, Justice Bradley continues:
Citizenship of the United States ought to be, and, according to the
Constitution, is, a sure and undoubted title to equal rights in any and
every State in this Union, subject to such regulations as the
legislature may rightfully prescribe. If a man be denied full equality
before the law, he is denied one of the essential rights of citizenship
as a citizen of the United States.
2 75
Therefore, Justice Bradley considered basic equality to be a right of
national citizenship. Justice Miller's analysis, on the other hand,
rejected such an assumption. According to him, the rights of national
citizenship were limited to a few non-fundamental rights, such as the
right to federal protection on the high seas, the right to petition the
federal government for redress of grievances and the right to use the
navigable waters of the United States. 276 Under Justice Miller's
formulation, United States citizenship did not include a general
guarantee of equality between citizens. Thus, it seems unlikely that
the anti-discrimination component of the right to travel recognized by
Justice Miller was grounded in the Citizenship Clause.
Alternatively, as previously noted, the equal protection aspect of
the right to travel may derive from anti-discrimination principles
embedded in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2. In other words, the right of equal treatment accorded to
interstate travelers under Article IV, Section 2 was extended by the
Fourteenth Amendment to individuals exercising their right to
migrate and settle in a new state.277 The right to migrate, however,
had already been recognized as a fundamental right under Article IV,
Section 2 by Justice Washington in Corfield.275 It is arguable,
therefore, that Article IV, Section 2 already guaranteed equal
protection between short-term and long-term state citizens. In fact,
one commentator asserts:
274. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 112-13 (Bradley, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
275. Id. at 113 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
276. Id. at 79. While Justice Miller conceded that the right secured by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was also a right of national
citizenship, he limited the scope of that clause to discrimination against newly
emancipated black citizens. Id. at 81.
277. See Lemper, supra note 265, at 304.
278. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546,552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
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In the end, the third component of the right to travel is largely
superfluous. Indeed, the third component merely reiterates what
the Court had indirectly recognized in defining the second
component of the right to travel: the principle of non-discrimination
applies to the right to migrate as well as the right to travel. -79
The Saenz Court appeared to adopt this rationale since it expressly
recognized the Fourteenth Amendment as an "additional source of
protection" for a right that is also protected by "the new arrival's
status as a state citizen."'
The problem with this second line of reasoning is that it conflicts
with Justice Miller's contention that the rights of state citizenship "are
not intended to have any additional protection by [the Privileges or
Immunities Clause]."28 Moreover, this analysis highlights another
problem with the Slaughter-House decision, namely that Justice
Miller's interpretation rendered the Privileges or Immunities Clause
superfluous.' It afforded no increased protection because the rights
he classified as rights of United States citizens were already protected
under the Constitution, in this case Article IV, Section 2. If a new
state citizen already had a right under Article IV, Section 2 to be free
from discrimination based on length of residence, why would the
Court need to rely on the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or
Immunities Clause to protect the right? Saenz, therefore, serves as
yet another reminder that the Privileges or Immunities Clause "enjoys
the distinction of having been rendered a practical nullity by a single
decision of the Supreme Court rendered within five years after its
ratification."'
279. Lemper, supra note 265, at 304.
280. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-3 (1999). This interpretation of the Saeniz
decision departs from Lemper's argument that Saenz "made explicit that the right to
migrate was located in, and secured by, the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship and
Privileges or Immunities Clauses, not Article IV or Justice Washington's opinion in
Corfield." Lemper, supra note 265, at 304.
281. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 74.
282. As Chemerinsky points out, the rights of United States citizenship articulated
by Justice Miller already existed prior to the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus:
[Tihe Slaughter-House Cases interpreted the provision in a manner to rob it
of all meaning. This was noted by the dissenting Justices. Justice Field, in
dissent, lamented: "If [the Privileges or Immunities Clause] only refers... to
such privileges and immunities as were before its adoption specially
designated in the Constitution or necessarily implied as belonging to citizens
of the United States, it was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished
nothing, and most unnecessarily excited Congress and the people on its
passage.
Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 377 (quoting Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96
(Field, J., dissenting)).
283. Id. (quoting Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, The
Constitution of the United States of America 965 (Edward S. Corwin ed. 1953)). The
Saenz decision has been criticized for trying to resurrect the Privileges or Immunities
Clause without overturning Slaughter-House:
It was the consensus of many that The Slaughter-House Cases were, in fact,
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Saenz followed a line of
reasoning similar to that in Maricopa, criticizing the majority for its
unwarranted expansion of the right to travel. Chief Justice Rehnquist
associated the right to travel with the "right to go from one place to
another," although he was willing to concede that the right to travel
may also include Article IV, Section 2's comity protection.2" Where
Chief Justice Rehnquist departed from the majority was in
characterizing, as a component of the right to travel, the right to
"become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bond fide residence
therein," with the same rights as other citizens of that State.285 He
noted that Justice Miller articulated this citizenship right as a separate
right from the right to travel,286 but that, beginning with Shapiro, the
Court had "conflated the right to travel with the right to equal state
citizenship."'  According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the right to
travel is not implicated in cases involving classifications based on
length of residency. These cases implicate the right of a state citizen
to be treated equally with other state citizens.m In addition, he
argued that durational residency requirements fall within the state's
power to establish objective tests of "bona fide residence," a
prerequisite for claiming the right of equal citizenship. 289 He noted
that "the Court has consistently recognized that while new citizens
must have the same opportunity to enjoy the privileges of being a
citizen of a State, the States retain the ability to use bona fide
residence requirements to ferret out those who intend to take the
privileges and run. ' 2 g
Justice Thomas argued in dissent that, while the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was probably
intended to protect the fundamental rights of citizens from
infringement by the states, the clause did not guarantee access to
"every public benefit established by positive law."'29 ' This statement
mischaracterized the holding of Saenz, however, which guaranteed,
not access to every public benefit, but equal treatment between short-
an obstacle to basing the right on the Privileges and Immunities Clause that
could not be overcome without overruling them. By failing to overturn The
Slaughter-House Cases, while still relying on the Privileges and Immunities
Clause as the basis for the constitutional right to interstate migration, the
Saenz Court passed up an opportunity to clarify the meaning of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause and arguably added to the confusion
surrounding interstate migration.
Ellis & Miller, supra note 30, at 347.
284. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 511-12 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) at 80).
286. Id. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 514 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
288. Id. at 515 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
289. Id. at 516-17 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
290. Id. at 517 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
291. Id. at 527 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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and long-term state citizens.2' Under Saenz, the equality guarantee
between state citizens included equal access to public benefits,
notwithstanding the fact that those benefits were not necessarily
"fundamental rights."293
While the Court's attempt to give judicial effect to the Privileges or
Immunities Clause is commendable, the Slaughter-House precedent
presents a significant challenge to the Court's effort. One of the most
interesting issues raised by Saenz is whether the Privileges or
Immunities Clause has any real viability as long as the Court
continues to adhere to the Slaughter-House rationale. Part III of this
Note argues the Court should reject Slaughter-House and find a
workable formulation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.-' Part
III further argues that the right to intrastate travel is a Privilege or
Immunity guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Before
discussing this aspect of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part II
will describe the circuit split that currently exists over the right to
intrastate travel.
II. THE DEBATE OVER THE RIGHT To INTRASTATE TRAVEL
While opinions differ as to its source, the right to interstate travel
has been consistently recognized by the Supreme Court since the
1800s.295 The Court has never expressly decided whether there is a
constitutional right to intrastate travel, however. In fact, in Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, the Court declined to consider whether
"a constitutional distinction between interstate and intrastate travel"
existed.2 96 Federal circuit courts, on the other hand, have addressed
this issue and are currently divided.
292. See Tribe, supra note 5, at 134-35.
293. One commentator cautions against the revival of a fundamental rights analysis
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Lemper, supra note 265, at 312. Lemper
warns that "by reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause and invoking Corfield's
fundamental rights language, Justice Stevens's opinion in Saenz... may indicate a
tendency to re-invigorate fundamental rights, under the doctrinal head of 'privileges
or immunities.' Id Such an approach would usher in a new era of unchecked judicial
activism, according to Lemper. Id. at 313. Lemper argues that Saenz should be
interpreted as reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause as an anti-
discrimination provision. Id. at 315.
294. Numerous commentators and scholars have advocated the overturning of
Slaughter-House. See Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 378. Chemerinsky points out that
"except for the privileges or immunities clause, all of the other restrictive
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases were
subsequently overruled." Id at 376. For a novel argument that incorporation of the
Bill of Rights does not necessitate overturning Slaughter-House, see Newsom, supra
note 3.
295. See supra Part I.
296. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250. 255-56 (1974). In
Maricopa, the Court expressly declined to decide the issue of whether intrastate travel
was federally protected. Although the statute implicated the right to intrastate travel
by requiring one-year residency in a particular county, the appellant in Maricopa was
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Some disagreement exists about whether the Supreme Court has, in
fact, settled the question of intrastate travel. It has been argued by at
least one commentator that a 1993 Supreme Court decision, Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,297 ruled out constitutional
protection for intrastate travel. 98
In Bray, the Supreme Court considered whether anti-abortion
protestors who obstructed abortion clinics had violated the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 by conspiring to deprive women seeking abortions
of their right to interstate travel. 99 Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, concluded that the activities of Operation Rescue, the anti-
abortion group, only restricted intrastate movement.) ° Scalia held
that "[s]uch a purely intrastate restriction does not implicate the right
of interstate travel, even if it is applied intentionally against travelers
from other States, unless it is applied discriminatorily against them." 0'
According to Gregory Hartch, the effect of Bray was to declare that
"intrastate travel is devoid of constitutional protection. 30 2
Commentator Mary LaFrance agrees, but points out that Bray "begs
the question of whether and how intrastate and interstate travel can
meaningfully be distinguished.""3 3 As LaFrance recognizes, Bray did
not specifically analyze the existence of a right of intrastate travel:
Both the majority and the dissent in Bray framed the question
as whether the activities in question -demonstrations which
actually traveling from another state. The Court noted:
Even were we to draw a constitutional distinction between interstate and
intrastate travel, a question we do not now consider, such a distinction would
not support the judgment of the Arizona court [because the appellant] has
been effectively penalized for his interstate migration, although this was
accomplished under the guise of a county residence requirement.
Id. at 255-56.
297. 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
298. Hartch, supra note 11, at 465.
299. Bray, 506 U.S. at 266-67.
300. Id. at 277.
301. Id.
302. Hartch, supra note 11, at 465. Nevertheless, Hartch points out that:
[N]one of the justices have offered a convincing explanation for why the
right to travel should be confined to interstate travel as opposed to both
interstate and intrastate travel. In Bray, the Court cited three cases to
support its contention that the right pertains solely to interstate travel.
These decisions affirm the existence of a right to interstate travel, but none
rule out the existence of a corresponding right to intrastate travel.
Id. at 470.
303. Mary LaFrance, Constitutional Implications Of Acquisition-Value Real
Property Taxation: Assessing the Burdens on Travel and Commerce, 1994 Utah L.
Rev. 1027, 1054 (interpreting Bray to "reject the existence of a right to intrastate
travel"). Another article notes, however, that "the Supreme Court has not ruled on
whether the right to travel includes the right to travel intrastate as well as interstate."
Maria Foscarinis, Downward Spiral: Homelessness and its Criminalization, 14 Yale L.
& Pol'y Rev. 1, 44 (1996). Foscarinis explains that Bray "was considering whether the
right to interstate travel was violated, not whether a right to interstate travel exists."
Id. at 44 n.341.
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blocked access to abortion clinics-interfered with the right of
interstate travel. Neither opinion addressed the question
whether a separate right of intrastate travel exists which might
be infringed by those same activities.-'
A 1999 Harvard Law Review article disputes the view that the
intrastate travel issue was resolved in Bray, noting that "[tihe
Supreme Court has expressly declined to rule on [the intrastate travel]
issue, although in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, the
Court indicated that the right may be confined solely to interstate
travel."3 5 The article continues, "[n]otvithstanding Bray, however,
lower courts consider the issue an open question."' Thus, even after
Bray was decided in 1993, several circuit courts treated the issue as
unresolved.
In Townes v. St. Louis, for example, the Eastern District Court of
Missouri asserted that the Supreme Court "has not determined
whether there is a fundamental right to intrastate travel." 31'
Furthermore, in an unpublished opinion, the Eighth Circuit affirmed
Townes after "[h]aving carefully reviewed the record" and concluding
that the district court's decision was correct. - Similarly, in Nunez v.
San Diego, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had
declined to decide the issue of whether the Constitution protects
intrastate travel.3° Again, in Hutchins v. District of Columbia, the
District of Columbia Circuit pointed out that "[tlhe Supreme Court in
Maricopa County specifically declined to decide whether the right to
interstate travel recognized in Shapiro has its analogue in intrastate
travel," and that "[t]he circuits are split on this question."""U
Federal circuit courts have addressed intrastate travel in a variety of
contexts. For example, the courts have examined municipal
durational residency requirements for recipients of public benefits,"'
304. Id. at 1055.
305. Search and Seizure- Automobile Exception- Search of Passengers'
Belongings, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 255,260 n.59 (1999) (citations omitted).
306. Id. (citing Nunez v. San Diego, 114 F.3d 935,944 n.7 (1997)).
307. Townes v. St. Louis, 949 F. Supp. 731, 734 (E.D. Mo. 1996), affd 112 F.3d 514
(8th Cir. 1997). Townes involved a city ordinance blocking access to a street. Id. at
732. The Townes court declined to weigh in on the intrastate travel issue, noting that
"[elven if this court were to conclude that a federal constitutional right to localized
intrastate travel exists" the ordinance would not violate the intermediate scrutiny
standard. Id. at 735. The court held that strict scrutiny would not apply to the right to
intrastate travel. Id.
308. Townes v. St. Louis, 112 F.3d 514 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (unpublished
table decision, available at 1997 WL 210442).
309. Nunez v. San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 944 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997). The court noted
that it "need not decide the issue in order to resolve this appeal, so we express no
opinion on it." Id.
310. Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531,537 (D.C. Cit. 1999).
311. See King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971); Cole
v. Hous. Auth. of Newport, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970).
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residence requirements for public employees, 312 salary differentials for
public employees based on residence,3 1 3 anti-cruising ordinances, 314
and juvenile curfews.1 5 The First, Second, and Third Circuits have
recognized a right to intrastate travel. The right has been rejected in
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits. The District of
Columbia Circuit is still on the fence, although it appears to be leaning
towards rejecting the right to intrastate travel.
In Cole v. Housing Authority of the City of Newport, the First
Circuit broke ground by striking down a restriction on the right to
intrastate travel.3 16 The regulation required applicants to reside in
Newport, Rhode Island for two years in order to be eligible for
federally funded public housing.317 Both plaintiffs in Cole were single
mothers with two children.3"8 One plaintiff moved to Newport from
another state, while the other moved from another city in Rhode
Island.319 Both plaintiffs were turned down for public housing because
they did not meet the residency requirement. 320
The court noted that the regulation created a classification, which, if
it involved a "fundamental personal right," would be subjected to
strict scrutiny.321 Relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Shapiro,
the Cole court determined the "right to travel is a fundamental
personal right. '322  Cole interpreted Shapiro to stand for the
proposition that the right to travel is impinged when a regulation
penalizes travel, concluding that travel does not also need to be
deterred by the regulation in order to trigger strict scrutiny.3 2' Thus,
under Shapiro, not every classification that "touches on the
fundamental right of interstate movement" would necessarily trigger
strict scrutiny, because some waiting periods might not be penalties.324
According to Cole, this apparent contradiction could be resolved by
realizing that Shapiro's conception of travel was limited to "migration
with intent to settle and abide," as opposed to freedom of
312. See Wardwell v. Board of Educ., 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976); Wright v. City of
Jackson, 506 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1975).
313. See Eldridge v. Bouchard, 645 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. Va 1986), afj'd without
opinion, 823 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1987).
314. See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990).
315. Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
316. Cole v. Hous. Auth. of Newport, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970).
317. Id. at 808.





323. Id. at 810.
324. Id. (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969)). The Court in
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County commended Judge Coffin for his "perceptive
opinion" in Cole, noting in particular his discussion of Shapiro's ambiguity regarding
the application of the strict scrutiny test. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415
U.S. 250, 257 n.10 (1974).
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movement.315  Thus, the right to travel would be impinged by
restricting access to a benefit that would be used while residing within
the state. On the other hand, individuals passing through a
community would not be penalized for traveling if they were denied
access to certain benefits within that community.32b For example,
under Cole's interpretation of Shapiro, waiting periods for obtaining a
divorce, getting a library card or even qualifying for lower college
tuition, might not constitute penalties.
While Cole's analysis is insightful, it is problematic because it
requires a court to examine a traveler's motive for traveling in order
to determine whether a restriction impermissibly burdens the right to
travel. Thus, a student who moved to a new state to attend college
with the intention of residing in that state indefinitely would be
"penalized" by a residency requirement for lower college tuition,
whereas a student who moved to the state without the intention of
remaining would not be penalized. In addition, there is no evidence
that the Supreme Court has limited its definition of travel in the way
that Cole suggests. On the contrary, one of the earliest Supreme
Court right to travel cases, Crandall v. State of Nevada,3 r involved a
restriction on movement across state lines, while the most recent case,
Saenz v. Roe,328 identified "the right of a citizen of one State to enter
and to leave another State" as one component of the right to travel.-"
It seems more likely that the Shapiro decision did not intend to
restrict the definition of travel but to limit the types of regulations that
would constitute penalties. As previously noted, under the Shapiro-
Dunn-Maricopa formulation, travel was considered to be penalized by
rules that deny either a basic necessity of life or another fundamental
right.33 Later, in Saenz, the Court sought to clarify its analysis by
dividing the right to travel into three components and eliminating the
requirement that a restrictive classification deny a basic necessity of
life or fundamental right to new residents, apparently holding that all
classifications that discriminate against new residents are suspect.3 '
Without directly addressing whether the right to travel
encompassed intrastate travel, the Cole court held that Newport's
residency requirement penalized new residents because they had
recently moved to Newport.3 2 Although the court did not expressly
identify a right to intrastate travel, the regulation applied to both
interstate and intrastate migrators, and the case itself involved
325. Cole, 435 F.2d at 811.
326. Id-
327. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
328. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
329. Id at 500.
330. See supra Part I.B.2.
331. See supra Part I.C.
332. Cole v. Hous. Auth. of Newport, 435 F.2d 807,811 (Ist Cir. 1970).
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plaintiffs of both types.333 The court, moreover, did not limit its
holding to the impact on interstate migration.334
Newport attempted to justify the waiting period on the ground that
it was necessary to ensure the survival of public housing, because
voters believed that eliminating the restriction would attract low-
income families to the community.335  Without the restriction,
Newport argued, voters would not support public housing, even if
their belief was false and the waiting period had no deterrent effect on
the poor.336 Thus, "the purpose and effect of the requirement are not
to impair the right to travel, but to make the voters think the right to
travel is being impaired, even though it is not. '337 The court rejected
this justification on the ground that "pandering to that mistaken
assumption" was not a compelling interest and that the goal itself
"rationalize[d] discriminatory classifications which are constitutionally
impermissible. ''338 The court also considered and rejected a past
contributions justification.339
The Second Circuit adopted much of Cole's reasoning to strike
down a five-year residency requirement in King v. New Rochelle
Municipal Housing Authority.340 New Rochelle, a city in New York
State, had passed a resolution requiring applicants for state-funded
public housing to be "resident[s] of the City of New Rochelle for not
less than five continuous years prior to the time of admission."' , The
city's justification for the residency requirement was that each
community should provide for the needs of its own residents before
trying to take care of the needs of other non-residents 4 2
The appeal involved three separate cases. Plaintiff-respondent
Earnestine King had moved to New Rochelle from North Carolina,
Gertrude Frazier had moved from Yonkers, New York, and Dorothy
Green had moved from White Plains, New York. 3  Each of the
respondents had either been denied an application or had applied for
public housing and been rejected for failing to meet the residency
requirement. The court applied an Equal Protection analysis,
noting that the city would have to show a compelling interest if a
fundamental personal right was implicated" 5
333. Id. at 809.





339. Id. at 813.
340. 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971).
341. Id. at 647.
342. Id. at 649.
343. Id. at 647.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 648.
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The court rejected the city's contention that, because there was no
fundamental right to intrastate travel, Green and Frazier's
fundamental rights were not affected.-' The court asserted that the
right to travel recognized in Shapiro was not limited to interstate
travel and that Shapiro's use of the term "interstate travel" reflected
nothing more than the fact that the case involved state-wide
legislation.' 47 Moreover, the court noted that Shapiro refused to
identify a particular constitutional provision as the source of the right
to travel, relying instead on "constitutional concepts of personal
liberty."'  Accordingly, "[it would be meaningless to describe the
right to travel between states as a fundamental precept of personal
liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to
travel within a state."' 9 The court also pointed out that it made little
sense to penalize the in-state migration of New York State residents
while permitting out-of-state migrators to have unrestricted access to
these New York State public benefits.""
The King court held that New Rochelle's residency requirement
created a classification that infringed the fundamental right to
travel.351 The city's resolution, according to the court, "penalizes
respondents by adding an additional period of as much as five years to
the time they must wait for public housing and.., this penalty is
imposed solely because they have recently exercised their right to
travel."35 2  Applying strict scrutiny, the court held that the city's
justification of "tak[ing] care of its own" was not compelling enough
to favor long-term residents in the allocation of public housing 53
The King court cited Cole in support of its holding, electing to
"adopt that court's analysis on the finer points involved and present in
[its] opinion only the broad fabric of our approach."3" Unfortunately,
as previously noted, Cole did not analyze the distinction between
interstate and intrastate travel. Thus, the King and Cole decisions,
taken together, provide very little analytical support for the existence
of a right to intrastate travel. In 1990, the Second Circuit reaffirmed
its recognition of the right to intrastate travel, noting that "the rule
enunciated in King remains the law in this Circuit."' -5
In Lutz v. City of York, the Third Circuit pointed out that the right
to intrastate travel recognized in King was "underarticulated" and
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id. (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,629 (1969)).
349. Id.
350. Id. at 648 n.6.
351. ld at 648.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 649.
354. Id. at 648.
355. Spencer v. Casavilla, 903 F.2d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 1990).
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sought to provide a more principled justification for the right. 356 In
Lutz, the court considered whether an anti-cruising ordinance
instituted by the City of York, Pennsylvania, violated the right to
localized intrastate movement. The ordinance was passed in response
to the problem of "unnecessary repetitive driving" around a certain
portion of the city, an activity apparently enjoyed by the "local
youth. '357 The ordinance imposed a fifty dollar fine for "[c]ruising,"
an offense defined as "driving a motor vehicle on a street past a traffic
control point... more than twice in any two (2) hour period, between
the hours of 7:00 p.m. and 3:30 a.m. ' 358
The Lutz court's first inquiry was whether a fundamental right to
intrastate travel existed. After surveying the Supreme Court's right to
travel case law, Lutz noted that most of the Court's recent cases
involved statutes that discriminated against recent interstate
migrants.35 9 The consequences of this trend were that, first, the
Supreme Court had not considered the question of intrastate travel,3 "1
and, second, that the Court's analysis had become so perfunctory that
it had stopped trying to identify a source of the right.36" ' Lutz pointed
out that this uncertainty, along with the plethora of textual and non-
textual sources suggested by various justices at various times, made it
difficult to determine whether or not the right to travel was, in fact, a
personal liberty, as asserted in Cole.62 In the view of the Lutz court,
however, the existence of the right to intrastate travel turned on this
critical issue.363
356. Lutz v. City of New York, 899 F.2d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 1990). The Third Circuit
had previously considered the right to intrastate travel in Wellford v. Battaglia, 343 F.
Supp. 143, 147 (D. Del. 1972), affid per curiam, 485 F.2d 1151 (3d Cir. 1973) and
Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd, 535
F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964
(1976). In Wellford, the court affirmed a district court decision striking down a city
residency requirement for mayors on the ground that it penalized the right to migrate
within the city. In Bykofsky, the court approved a district court decision upholding a
juvenile curfew ordinance on the ground that the juveniles' constitutional right to
intrastate travel was outweighed by the governmental interests involved. Id. at 1261.
357. Lutz, 899 F.2d at 256-57.
358. Id. at 256 (quoting York, Pa., Ordinance 6, § 3(a) (Apr. 19, 1988)).
359. Id. at 259.
360. As Lutz noted, the Supreme Court expressly reserved the question of
intrastate travel in Maricopa. Id. at 261.
361. Id. at 260-61. The use of the term "source" in Lutz differs from its use in this
Note. This Note distinguishes between the "source of the right" and "federal
protection of the right," while Lutz conflates those concepts. Thus, Lutz concludes
that the right to intrastate travel "exists, and grows out of substantive due process."
Id. at 256. In fact these two concepts can be separated and a fundamental right to
intrastate travel can be found to exist as a personal liberty right, while the Due
Process Clause can be found to provide federal protection over that right.
362. Id. at 260-61.
363. Id. at 261-62. According to Lutz:
To the extent that the right to travel is an aspect of personal liberty
protected by substantive due process, for example - and there is a clear line
of cases cited in Shapiro at least suggesting that it is - the proposition
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In attempting to identify the "source" of the right to intrastate
travel, Lutz analyzed the various constitutional provisions and
doctrines that had been suggested as sources of the right to interstate
travel (i.e., Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause,' Fourteenth
Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause, the rights of national
citizenship,3 66 the Commerce Clause,. 7 the Equal Protection Clause,'
and substantive due process.3 69)
Ultimately, the court settled on the doctrine of substantive due
process as the source of the right to intrastate travel. The court noted
that early Supreme Court dicta indicated that a fundamental right to
locomotion might exist. For example, the Court pointed out that "the
right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another
according to inclination, is an attribute of liberty.., secured by the
14th amendment.""37  Lutz noted, however, that, in order to have
credibility as a substantive due process right, the travel aspect of Fears
would have to be disassociated from the general spirit of Lochner v.
New York.371 After considering the substantive due process case law
relating to the right to travel, Lutz concluded that, while the Due
Process Clause was the only constitutional provision which, in its
opinion, could "create a right of localized intrastate movement," none
of the cases since the "demise of Lochner" had considered the issue. - -
Thus, the Lutz court found itself facing the task of trying to
extrapolate a right to intrastate travel from the precepts of modern
asserted by the Second Circuit [that the right to intrastate travel is a
fundamental personal right] is unimpeachable. However, to the extent that
the right to travel grows out of constitutional text animated by structural
concerns of federalism - a no less implausible view under many of the
Court's older major travel precedents - it might be entirely 'meaningful' to
suppose that the right is not implicated by reasonable restrictions on
localized intrastate movement.
Id
364. Id at 262-63.
365. Id. at 263-64. The court declined to locate the "source" of the right to travel in
this clause because the Supreme Court's case law indicated that the clause does not
create rights but protects already existing rights of national citizenship. Lutz
appeared to assume, rather than explain, why intrastate travel is not a right of
national citizenship. In addition, Lutz seemed to dismiss the clause because it -has
remained essentially moribund since Slaughter-House." Id. at 264.
366. Id. at 264-65.
367. Id. at 265.
368. Id
369. Id. at 266-68.
370. Id. at 266 (quoting Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270,274 (1900)).
371. Lutz pointed out, for example, that "Fears itself.., continues: 'And so as to
the right to contract.' It seems uncertain, therefore, whether these old cases have
significant continuing precedential value." Id. (quoting Fears, 179 U.S. at 274).
372. Id. at 267. The court noted, for example, that the recognition of a substantive
due process "right of locomotion" in Fears may not carry much precedential weight




substantive due process. 373 Lutz argued that, while most fundamental
rights protected by the Due Process Clause implicated family and
reproductive matters, "the right to move freely about one's
neighborhood or town, even by automobile" met the narrowest due
process standard in that it was "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" and was "deeply rooted in the Nation's history. '374
Having recognized intrastate travel as a due process right, the court
upheld the anti-cruising ordinance, nevertheless, by subjecting it to
intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny. The court applied
the time, place and manner doctrine found in free speech
jurisprudence, arguing that "the time, place and manner doctrine
allows certain restrictions on speech to survive under less than fully
strict scrutiny" and reasoning that "[i]f the freedom of speech itself
can be so qualified, then surely the unenumerated right of localized
travel can be as well."37 The court concluded that the ordinance was
"narrowly tailored to combatting the safety and congestion problems
identified by the city. 3 76 The application of intermediate scrutiny was
a significant departure from the traditional substantive due process
approach, which is based on the theory that, if a right is
"fundamental," the state must have a compelling reason to restrict
it.377  Thus, Lutz's application of intermediate scrutiny to a
fundamental right was at odds with the doctrine of substantive due
process and is unlikely to be adopted by the Supreme Court.378
Four circuit courts have rejected a constitutional right to intrastate
travel. In 1987, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court's
decision in Eldridge v. Bouchard upholding the State of Virginia's
policy of paying police officers different salaries based on their
districts.3 79  The district court held that "plaintiffs do not have a
federally recognized fundamental right of intrastate travel."3 80
According to the court, "[h]aving a fundamental right of interstate
travel does not necessitate recognizing a fundamental right of
intrastate travel. In fact, it is entirely consistent to recognize the right
373. Id. at 267.
374. Id. at 267-68 (citations omitted).
375. Id. at 269.
376. Id. at 270.
377. See Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 643. The Supreme Court has generally
applied intermediate scrutiny when analyzing semi-suspect classifications under the
Equal Protection Clause. Examples of semi-suspect classes are women, illegitimate
children and illegal alien children. Id. at 415-16.
378. At least one commentator criticizes the Lutz court for using intermediate
scrutiny, arguing that the court's "analysis is an aberration that deploys non-strict
scrutiny to arrive at the answer it thinks proper" and pointing out that intermediate
scrutiny implicitly categorizes the right to intrastate travel as "quasi-fundamental."
Porter, supra note 91, at 854-55.
379. Eldridge v. Bouchard, 645 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. Va. 1986), affd without opinion,
823 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1987).
380. Id. at 754.
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to interstate travel without recognizing the right of intrastate
travel.
381
In Wright v. City of Jackson, the Fifth Circuit upheld a city
ordinance requiring municipal employees to live within the city
limits.3" A group of non-resident firemen brought a class action
lawsuit against the City of Jackson, claiming that the ordinance denied
their right to travel and to select their residence. ' The court's
conclusion that the right to travel doctrine articulated in Shapiro did
not apply to intrastate travel was based entirely on the Supreme
Court's dismissal of Detroit Police Officers Association v. City of
Detroit.' Detroit Police involved a municipal ordinance similar to the
residency requirement in Wright.' The Michigan Supreme Court
upheld the ordinance under the traditional equal protection test,
finding that the classification passed rational-basis review.Y
Subsequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the case on appeal for
"want of a substantial federal question."' The Wright court
concluded that the Supreme Court's disposition of Detroit Police was
equivalent to a finding that there was no federally protected right of
intrastate travel.' Consequently, the Wright court upheld Jackson's
ordinance as being rationally related to the legitimate government
objectives of promoting ethnic balance, reducing unemployment rates
of minorities, improving relations between minorities and city
employees, enhancing job performance of municipal employees,
reducing absenteeism, increasing availability of trained emergency
personnel, and encouraging local expenditure of employees'
salaries. 3 9
There is some evidence that the Fifth Circuit may be retreating
from its position on the right to intrastate travel. In Qutb v. Strauss,
the Fifth Circuit applied strict scrutiny to a Dallas juvenile curfew
ordinance. 90 In analyzing the ordinance, the court "assume[d]
without deciding that the right to move about freely is a fundamental
right. '39 1  The court upheld the ordinance, however, noting that
"under certain circumstances, minors may be treated differently from
adults."3"
381. kd
382. 506 F.2d 900, 901-02 (5th Cir. 1975).
383. Id at 901.
384. Id. at 902-03 (citing Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 405 U.S.
950 (1972)).
385. Id. at 902.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 903 (citation omitted).
388. Id.
389. Id. at 903-04.
390. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488,496 (5th Cir. 1993).




In Wardwell v. Board of Education, the Sixth Circuit upheld a
School Board rule requiring public school teachers hired after
November 13, 1972, to reside within the school district.393 In declining
to recognize a right to intrastate travel, the Wardwell court followed
the same line of reasoning as the Fifth Circuit in Wright, concluding
that the Supreme Court's disposition of Detroit Police amounted to a
decision on the merits.394 Accordingly, the Wardwell court held that
the rational relationship test was the appropriate standard of review
for residency requirements affecting intrastate movement.395 The
court concluded that the rule was rationally related to the School
Board's objectives of encouraging integration and of hiring teachers
who are likely to be committed to the urban educational system,
supportive of school-related taxes, in closer contact with parents and
community leaders, and sympathetic to their students' social
problems.396
Like the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit also viewed
the Supreme Court's dismissal of Detroit Police as a disposition of the
question of intrastate travel. Ahern v. Murphy involved a Chicago
ordinance that required police officers to reside in the city of
Chicago.397 The court upheld the ordinance, noting that the "Supreme
Court has labeled as unsubstantial the very question which constitutes
the plaintiffs' most likely basis for asserting federal question
jurisdiction. 398
The circuit courts in Wright, Wardwell and Ahern viewed the
Supreme Court's dismissal of Detroit Police as a substantive holding in
the issue of intrastate travel. As at least one commentator has argued,
however, this position is not a forgone conclusion.399 First, a Supreme
Court dismissal should not be relied on as binding precedent because
the Court has not explained its reasoning.4 °0 Second, the dismissal
may mean that the Court does not consider the case worthy of its
time.401 Third, the dismissal may mean that while the Court agrees
with the outcome of the case it does not necessarily adopt the
393. Wardwell v. Board of Educ., 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976).
394. Id. at 627-28.
395. Id. at 628.
396. Id.
397. Ahem v. Murphy, 457 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1972).
398. Id. at 365 (quoting Port Auth. Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Port of New
York Auth., 387 F.2d 259, 262 (2d Cir. 1967)). One commentator points out that the
Seventh Circuit may yet be undecided on the issue of intrastate travel because five
years after Ahern was decided, the court noted that it "need not consider whether a
right of intrastate travel should be acknowledged." Gregory J. Mode, Wisconsin, A
Constitutional Right to Intrastate Travel, and Anti-Cruising Ordinances, 78 Marq. L.
Rev. 735, 748 (1995) (quoting Andre v. Board of Trs., 561 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1977)).
399. Porter, supra note 91, at 843.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 844.
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reasoning of the lower court. 2 Thus, in the case of Detroit Police, the
Court may have believed that the ordinance would withstand strict
scrutiny.4°3
In Hutchins v. District of Columbia, the District of Columbia Circuit
considered whether a juvenile curfew law violated the substantive due
process right of free movement.' The court declined to decide the
question of whether a fundamental right to intrastate movement
existed. It noted, however, that the issue was "not whether
Americans enjoy a general right of free movement, but rather
whatever are the scope and dimensions of such a right (if it e.,ists), do
minors have such a substantive right?"' The court concluded that
minors, in fact, do not have a fundamental right to roam the streets at
night unsupervised.'
Several commentators have argued that the Supreme Court should
recognize a constitutional right to intrastate travel. In most cases,
these commentators ground the right either in the substantive due
process doctrine or the Equal Protection Clause. For example, Paul
Ades argues that the right to travel intrastate should be protected
under both due process and equal protection and should be used to
combat anti-homelessness laws." According to Ades, statutes that
prohibit sleeping outdoors burden the free movement of homeless
people who, because of financial constraints, are more likely to
exercise their freedom of movement intrastate as opposed to
402- Id.
403. Id.
404. Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
405. Id. at 538.
406. Id. Other circuit courts have analyzed juvenile curfew laws. For example, the
Third Circuit affirmed the constitutionality of a juvenile curfew in Bykofskly V.
Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d
Cir. 1976) (unpublished table decision). cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976). The Fifth
Circuit upheld a curfew law under strict scrutiny analysis in Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d
488 (5th Cir. 1993). In Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997), the
Ninth Circuit struck down a curfew under strict scrutiny analysis. In Schleifer v. City
of Charlottesville, 992 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Va. 1997). affd, 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1018 (1999), the Fourth Circuit upheld a juvenile curfew
under intermediate scrutiny. For a discussion of the appropriate standard of review
to apply to juvenile curfews, see Patryk J. Chudy, Note, Doctrinal Reconstruction:
Reconciling Conflicting Standards in Adjudicating Juvenile Curfew Challenges, 85
Cornell L. Rev. 518 (2000) (arguing that intrastate travel is a fundamental right and
that intermediate scrutiny should be used to analyze juvenile curfews). Chudy
highlights the curious fact that circuit courts rejecting intrastate travel as a
fundamental right have, nevertheless, been more hostile to juvenile curfews than
courts that recognize the right. Id at 567. Another student Note analyzing juvenile
curfews is Brant K. Brown, Note, Scrutinizing Juvenile Curfews: Constitutional
Standards & the Fundamental Rights of Juveniles & Parents, 53 Vand. L Rev. 653
(2000) (arguing that intermediate scrutiny should be applied to juvenile curfews).
407. Paul Ades, The Unconstitutionality of "Antihomneless' Law: Ordinances
Prohibiting Sleeping in Outdoor Public Areas as a Violation of tie Right to Travel, 77
Cal. L. Rev. 595, 605-06 (1989).
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interstate.4" Similarly, Emilia Wang argues that substantive due
process is the "most viable constitutional source supporting a
federally-protected right to intrastate travel.""4 9 Andrew Porter also
suggests that the substantive due process doctrine is the "proper
source for the right to travel intrastate," conceding, however, that the
doctrine's viability as a source for new rights is questionable."0 Part
III of this Note argues that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
provides an alternate basis for protecting intrastate travel that
circumvents some of the problems associated with substantive due
process. Before resolving the issue of intrastate travel, however, Part
III will provide some background on the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.
III. THE RIGHT TO INTRASTATE TRAVEL Is A PRIVILEGE OR
IMMUNITY OF UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP
A. Background on the Privileges or Immunities Clause
One of the primary purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
ensure the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866."' The
Civil Rights Act, passed by Congress in the aftermath of the Civil
War, declared all persons born in the United States to be United
States citizens and guaranteed citizens of every race and color the
same right.., to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by
white citizens.412
In other words, it guaranteed equal rights between whites and non-
whites with respect to the enumerated activities.4"3 Concern over the
validity and the survival of the Civil Rights Act prompted the
Republican-controlled Congress to pass the Fourteenth
408. Id. at 616-17.
409. Emilia P. Wang, Case Comment, Individual Rights- Unenumerated Rights-
Are Unenumerated Rights a Viable Source for the Right to Intrastate Travel? Watt v.
Watt, 971 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 1999), 31 Rutgers L.J. 1053, 1063-64 (2000) (noting that the
Supreme Court of Wyoming's decision to ground the right to intrastate travel in the
unenumerated rights clause of the Wyoming Constitution went "against the grain of
the generally accepted argument that due process is the proper source").
410. Porter, supra note 91, at 850.
411. Chester James Antieau, The Original Understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment 2 (1981); Curtis, Resurrecting, supra note 3, at 33; Harrison, supra note
116, at 1389.
412. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted by the Enforcement Act of
1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1994))).
413. Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, The Courts, and Human Rights 62 (1982).
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Amendment,41 4 embodying the principles of the Civil Rights Act and
granting Congress the power to enforce those principles through
legislation. 15
The true meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause has been a
source of confusion and consternation for constitutional scholars and
judges since the Fourteenth Amendment was first passed!u6 What are
the Privileges or Immunities of United States citizens? Numerous
answers to this question have been suggested. They are the
fundamental rights or natural rights belonging to a citizen of a free
society.417 They are the rights embodied in the first eight amendments
to the Constitution, made applicable to and enforceable against state
governments.418  They are limited rights emanating from the
relationship between the federal government and its citizens.41 9 They
are unspecified rights to be enumerated and defined through future
414. Curtis, Resurrecting, supra note 3. at 33. Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
415. Antieau, supra note 411, at 2. Professor Perry argues that the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment intended merely to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act,
not to ensure complete "political and social equality" for the freed slaves. Perry, supra
note 413, at 62. Nevertheless, according to Perry, even if the Fourteenth Amendment
was intended to protect additional rights, it was at most intended to protect the same
kinds of rights as those articulated in the Act. Id. Those rights pertained to the
"physical security of one's person, freedom of movement, and capacity to make
contracts and to acquire, hold and transfer chattels and land-'life, liberty, and
property' in the narrow original sense." Id. at 62-63 (citing R. Berger, Government by
Judiciary 22-30 (1977)).
416. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalisni n the Era of the
Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 863, 864 & n.8 (1986) [hereinafter
Kaczorowski, Revolutionary].
417. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 95 (1872) (Field, J.
dissenting) ("The fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities which belong to (a
United States citizen] as a free man and a free citizen, now belong to him as a citizen
of the United States, and are not dependent upon his citizenship of any State.").
418. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74-75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting)
According to Black:
[T]he language of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, taken as a
whole, was thought by those responsible for its submission to the people,
and by those who opposed its submission, sufficiently explicit to guarantee
that thereafter no state could deprive its citizens of the privileges and
protections of the Bill of Rights.
Id. But see, Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill
of Rights?, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5, 132-39 (1949) (arguing that incorporation would not
have been attempted by the thirty-ninth Congress, nor would it have been accepted
by the people or ratified by the legislatures).
419. See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78-80.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
legislation.42 They are the primary, fundamental rights of national
citizenship.42'
While there may be as many opinions on the clause as there are
scholars and judges, most of these critics share the common conviction
that the privileges or immunities of national citizenship are something
other than the limited group of rights recognized by Justice Miller in
Slaughter-House.4" He delineated a rigid barrier between rights of
state citizenship and rights of national citizenship, arguing that the
fundamental rights articulated by Justice Washington in Corfield were
privileges and immunities of state citizenship, subject to the exclusive
protection by the states. It has been noted by scholars, however, that
Justice Miller misquoted both Justice Washington and Article IV,
Section 2, and mischaracterized Washington's comments regarding
Article IV Privileges and Immunities.4 3 Justice Miller altered Justice
Washington's famous question "what are the privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States?" rendering it "what are
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States?"4 4 He
420. See Antieau, supra note 411, at 39 (quoting Congressman John Bingham's
statement that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was "to arm the Congress
of the United States, by the Consent of the people of the United States, with the
power to enforce the bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution. It hath that extent -
no more" (citing Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1088 (1866)).
421. See Kaczorowski, Revolutionary, supra note 416, at 915. Kaczorowski notes
that the Citizenship Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause operate together
as an "affirmative recognition of the fundamental rights" of United States citizens. Id.
Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment "did not merely secure the right to be free
from state infringements of fundamental rights, it delegated to Congress the requisite
authority to secure these rights directly." Id.
422. Richard L. Aynes, supra note 3, at 627 (stating that "'everyone' agrees the
Court incorrectly interpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause"); Robert J.
Kaczorowski, Reflections on "From Slaves to Citizens", 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 2141,
2143-44 (1996) [hereinafter Kaczorowski, Reflections] ("While most constitutional
scholars believe that the Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House Cases interpreted the
Fourteenth Amendment's privileges or immunities clause more narrowly than the
framers intended in rejecting its apparent guarantee of fundamental rights, the
question of what rights the framers intended to secure remains controversial.").
Justice Miller identified Privileges or Immunities of United States citizens to be those
"which owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its
Constitution, or its laws." Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79. These rights
include the protection by the Federal government of a citizen's life, liberty and
property on the high seas or in a foreign country, the right to assemble and petition
for redress of grievances, the right of the writ of habeas corpus, the right to use the
nation's navigable waters, the rights guaranteed by international treaties and the right
to establish citizenship in any state of the Union. Id. at 79-80.
423. See, e.g., Louis Lusky, By What Right?: A Commentary on the Supreme
Court's Power to Revise the Constitution 194-95 (1975) (arguing that Justice Miller
intentionally misquoted the clause); Aynes, supra note 3, at 646-48.
424. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 76 (emphasis added). Justice Bradley
pointed out this error in his dissent, noting that "both the clause of the Constitution
referred to, and Justice Washington in his comment on it, speak of the privileges and
immunities of citizens in a State; not of citizens of a state." Id. at 117 (Bradley, J.,
dissenting).
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then characterized the privileges and immunities referred to in Article
IV, Section 2 as, "[i]n the language of Judge Washington, those rights
which are fundamental."4zs Moreover, according to Justice Miller:
Throughout [Justice Washington's] opinion, they are spoken of as
rights belonging to the individual as a citizen of a State. They are so
spoken of in the constitutional provision which he was construing.
And they have always been held to be the class of rights which the
State governments were created to establish and secure. 26
Justice Washington's original language indicated, however, that the
rights he listed were not rights "of' state citizens, but rights a citizen
enjoys while present "in" a state.427
Justice Miller, in Slaughter-House, further assumed that Congress
had not intended to subject these fundamental rights to the protection
of the national government because such an action would have
dramatically usurped state sovereignty. Had Congress intended such
a radical transformation of the federal structure, it would have
expressly stated that intent, according to Justice Miller 4 Thus, he
concluded, the rights of United States citizenship were not the
fundamental rights articulated by Justice Washington, but a separate
group of rights expressly conferred by the federal government on its
citizens. 429
Justice Washington, however, did not describe these fundamental
rights as privileges or immunities of state citizenship exclusively. In
fact, a close reading of his opinion leads more naturally to the
opposite conclusion. He noted that Privileges and Immunities were
rights "which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right,
to the citizens of all free governments."" 0 Thus, Justice Washington
described fundamental rights as belonging to citizens of all free
governments, not merely to citizens of the states. Therefore, his
statement does not imply that these rights do not also belong to
individuals as citizens of the United States. In fact, it may be inferred
that citizenship in the United States, a free government, would entitle
a person to these fundamental rights as well. It should also be noted
that one of Justice Washington's Privileges or Immunities "of citizens
in the Several States" is considered by almost all constitutional
authorities, including Justice Miller, to be a right of national
425. Id. at 76.
426. Id. at 76.
427. See id. at 117 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
428. Id at 77-78.
429. Id While Justice Miller declined to define all the rights of United States
citizenship, he explained that they are rights "which owe their existence to the
Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws." Id. at 79.
Some examples given by Justice Miller were the right to travel, the right to protection
over life, liberty and property on the high seas, the right to assemble and petition the
government, and the writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 79-80.
430. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546,551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
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citizenship. That is the the right to travel.431 According to Justice
Washington, this right, along with the rights of life, liberty and
property "may be mentioned as some of the privileges and immunities
of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of
privileges deemed to be fundamental. 432
Based on the foregoing, Justice Miller's conclusion that Justice
Washington spoke exclusively of state citizenship rights is untenable.
So, too, is Justice Miller's argument that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not grant protection to
these rights. This conclusion rests on the questionable assumption
that, had the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to
transfer power to the federal government to enforce these individual
rights against the states, they would have made their intent more
explicit.433 Justice Miller offered not one shred of objective evidence,
however, to support his assumption that the Framers did not intend to
grant federal protection to basic fundamental rights.'- As
constitutional theorist Leonard Levy points out, Justice Miller's
decision was a classic example of bad lawmaking justified by bad
history.4 35 According to Levy, "[b]y making that clause a nullity, the
Court in effect amended the Constitution, doomed a comprehensive
federal program for the protection of civil rights, and paved the
constitutional way for Jim Crow. ' 43 6 The Court did this by "speaking
of the purpose and intent of the amendment," without ever citing or
referring to "the Congressional Globe or the state records that would
show historical purpose and intent. 4 37
431. Id. at 552 (identifying the "right of the citizen of one state to pass through, or
to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or
otherwise" as a privilege and immunity).
432. Id.
433. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78. Justice Miller wrote:
The argument we admit is not always the most conclusive which is drawn
from the consequences urged against the adoption of a particular
construction of an instrument. But when, as in the case before us, these
consequences are so serious, so far-reaching and pervading, so great a
departure from the structure and spirit of our institutions; when the effect is
to fetter and degrade the State governments by subjecting them to the
control of Congress, in the exercise of powers heretofore universally
conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental character; when in
fact it radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the State and
Federal governments to each other and of both these governments to the
people; the argument has a force that is irresistible, in the absence of
language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt.
We are convinced that no such results were intended by the Congress
which proposed these amendments, nor by the legislatures of the States
which ratified them.
Id.
434. Leonard Levy, Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution 316 (1988).
435. Id. at 315.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 316.
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One of the most important purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment, from the perspective of the Framers, was to establish the
primacy of United States citizenship and to give the national
government authority to protect the civil rights of African-
Americans.4 38 Prior to the Civil War, the states were imbued with the
authority and responsibility to protect the fundamental rights of the
individual.439  After the Civil War and during the period of
Reconstruction, however, civil rights abuses by Southern states led
Congress to enact the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth
Amendment in order to ensure the freedom of former slaves."
Contrary to Justice Miller's assertion in Slaughter-House, the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to pierce the mantle of state
sovereignty and extend federal protection over the fundamental rights
of United States Citizens residing in the states." Moreover, this
protection, while primarily intended to benefit African-Americans,
was not limited to that race. As Professor Kaczorowski points out,
"although African-Americans were the intended primary beneficiaries
of constitutional and statutory guarantees of citizens' rights, they were
not the only intended beneficiaries. The evidence is clear that the
framers intended also to protect their white allies in the South."' -
When the Fourteenth Amendment is viewed within the historical
context of Reconstruction, it becomes apparent that the Framers
selected the phrase "Privileges or Immunities," parallelling the
language of Article IV, Section 2,* 1 not to articulate a dichotomy
between state and national rights, but to bring those same
fundamental rights under the protection of the federal government.*
During the Congressional debates over the Fourteenth Amendment,
supporters of the proposal continually cited Justice Washington's
opinion to describe the rights to be encompassed by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause.4' s Thus, it is evident
438. See Kaczorowski, Revohtionary, supra note 416, at 866-67. Professor
Kaczorowski explains that ascertaining Framers' intent is "a dubious project at best"
because the Framers' intent "can only be discerned to relative degrees of certainty."
Id. Nevertheless, a failure by scholars to appreciate the critical issues that motivated
the Framers has led to "excessive uncertainty" surrounding the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 866.
439. Id. at 871.
440. Id. at 875-77.
441. See id.
442. Kaczorowski, Reflections, supra note 422, at 2146.
443. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 n.15 (1999) (noting that "the Framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment modeled this clause upon the 'Privileges and Immunities'
Clause found in Article IV" (citing Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1033-34
(1866))).
444. See Chemerinsky supra note 3, at 374.
445. See id. Chemerinsky notes that the Framers' use of the terms "privileges" and
"immunities" indicated their intent to protect fundamental rights against infringement
by the states. Id. He points out that during the Congressional debates, proponents of
the Amendment quoted Justice Washington's statement in Corfield, defining
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that one of the Framers' primary intentions was to grant direct federal
protection to the Privileges and Immunities articulated by Justice
Washington." 6  Professor Kaczorowski notes that "[b]ecause the
framers defined United States citizens to be freemen, they interpreted
the privileges and immunities of citizenship as the natural rights of
freemen."' 4 History demonstrates, therefore, that the Framers most
likely intended the Privileges or Immunities Clause to confer federal
protection over the fundamental rights of citizens.
Scholars have debated the wisdom of resurrecting the Privileges or
Immunities Clause at this late stage and have reached differing
conclusions." One issue that arises is whether fundamental rights
protection under the clause would replace, augment or contract
substantive due process jurisprudence.449 The advantages of replacing
equal protection and due process analysis are debatable, particularly if
one takes the view that fundamental rights analysis would not have
developed much differently under the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. While an in-depth analysis of these issues is beyond the scope
of this Note, utilizing the Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect
substantive rights would arguably give fundamental rights analysis
more legitimacy.40 As Richard Aynes points out, even conservative
constitutional theorists concede that the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to protect "some substantial rights" under the rubric of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.45' Thus, the protection of
"unenumerated" rights under that clause might be more palatable to
those who reject the jurisprudence of substantive due process.
privileges and immunities. Id.
446. Id.
447. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary, supra note 416, at 912.
448. See e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction
of the Law 166 (1990) (describing the Privileges or Immunities Clause as properly
remaining "a dead letter" since its adoption); Michael Kent Curtis, Historical
Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of
the United States, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 1071 (2000) (arguing that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause was intended to protect fundamental rights, including those rights
articulated in the Bill of Rights); Jeffrey Rosen, Translating the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1241, 1241-42 (1998) (arguing that any
attempt to resurrect the Privileges or Immunities Clause in its original context will
lead back down the path to Lochner).
449. See Newsom, supra note 3, at 646; Tribe, supra note 5, at 195-96 (speculating
about the "risks... of transplanting rights from their current substantive due process
soil, however barren, to the heady mountains of privileges or immunities").
450. See Newsom, supra note 3, at 650. Newsom argues that his interpretation of
Slaughter-House
would permit courts to lay aside the historically confused and semantically
untenable doctrine of 'substantive due process,' a doctrine that has for years
visited suspicion and disrepute on the judiciary's attempt to protect even
textually specified constitutional freedoms, such as those set out in the Bill
of Rights, against state interference.
Id.
451. Aynes, supra note 3, at 628.
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Laurence Tribe also argues that "perennial dissatisfaction with the
whole concept of substantive due process, both linguistically and
historically, in themselves support the use of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as a less troublesome vehicle both for selective
incorporation and for the elaboration of whatever unenumerated
rights merit protection against the states."'4
B. Analyzing the Right to Travel as a Privilege or Immunity
Supreme Court case law reveals that principles of federal
sovereignty and personal liberty converge to create a right to travel. 3
Since the inception of the Union, this right has been afforded federal
protection across state borders.4- The remainder of this Part argues
that there is a fundamental right to free movement within state
borders as well. Moreover, the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment grants federal protection over this right
against state abridgement.
Careful analysis of the Supreme Court's case law reveals that the
right to travel is best understood as a right that emanates from the
direct relationship between a United States citizen and the federal
government 55 The nature of federal sovereignty is such that it
supercedes state sovereignty, bestowing certain rights directly on its
own citizens-rights that may not be abridged by state governments.:
The right to travel, however, is not merely an aspect of federal power,
imposed solely for the purpose of advancing national interest. It is a
right that vests in the citizen. The relationship between the United
States citizen and the federal government is the relationship of a free
citizen to a government built upon principles of freedom and liberty.4 7
Under a strict federal sovereignty view, the right to travel is
perceived primarily as a means of consolidating national power 5"
Proponents of this view fail to acknowledge, however, that the Union
was conceived as a means of promoting a free society, not the other
way around.459 On the other hand, a strict personal liberty approach
452. Tribe, supra note 5, at 193-94 (footnotes omitted).
453. See supra Part I.A.3.
454. See supra Part I.
455. See supra Part I.A.
456. See supra Part I.A.
457. See supra Part I.A.3.
458. See supra Part I.A.1.
459. See U.S. Const. pmbl. The Preamble of the Constitution reads:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America.
Id (emphasis added). In Federalist No. 1, Hamilton assured his "countrymen" that
the federal government created by the Constitution was "the safest course for your
liberty, your dignity, and your happiness." Hamilton asserted that the Union would
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does not tell the whole story of the right to travel either. The
Supreme Court rarely articulated the right to travel solely as a
personal liberty right."6 Moreover, the most accurate conception of
the right to travel combines principles of federal sovereignty and
personal liberty.4 61  Thus, the right to travel flows from the
relationship between the United States citizen and the federal
government, harmonizing dual aspects of sovereignty and liberty, and
existing for the benefit of both parties.462 Logically, this right should
not be limited to interstate travel but should include all movement
within the United States. Furthermore, the existence of a federally-
protected right to intrastate travel is supported by both case law and
history.
The Supreme Court has indicated that there may be a fundamental
right to free movement that transcends interstate travel. In Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, for example, the Court recognized a right of "locomotion"
which included "not only the right of the citizen to be free from the
mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but.., to be
free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all
lawful ways; to live and work where he will."463 In Williams v. Fears,
Chief Justice Fuller noted that "the right of locomotion" recognized in
Allgeyer, included "the right to remove from one place to another
according to inclination."4" Furthermore, he considered the right of
locomotion to be "an attribute of personal liberty."4 6  Moreover,
according to Chief Justice Fuller, "the right, ordinarily, of free transit
from or through the territory of any State is a right secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment and by other provisions of the
Constitution."46
Chief Justice Taney assumed the existence of the right to free
movement within a state, extending it to interstate movement, when
he wrote "[w]e are all citizens of the United States; and, as members
of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass
promote "political prosperity" and that the adoption of the Constitution would afford
"additional security" to "liberty, and to property." The Federalist No. 1, at 4
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). Constitutional scholar Michael
Kent Curtis notes that:
In accordance with the Declaration, a basic purpose of government was to
secure people their rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and
their right to govern themselves. Keeping state government from destroying
these values was therefore consistent with the proper role of state
governments and entirely consistent with federalism.
Curtis, Resurrecting, supra note 3, at 34-35.
460. See supra Part I.
461. See supra Part I.A.3.
462. See supra Part I.A.3.
463. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578,589 (1897).
464. Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900).
465. Id.
466. Id. (emphasis added).
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through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own
States. '467 In addition, a right to intrastate movement may be inferred
from Justice Miller's opinion in Crandall where he wrote that the
United States citizen must have free access to all the offices of the
federal government "independent of the will of any State over whose
soil he must pass in the exercise of it."' Justice Miller implicitly
recognizes, therefore, that interstate travel implicates movement
within state borders. In fact, how can a citizen have a fundamental
right to cross the borders of a state if he has no fundamental right to
get to the border? 9 Moreover, in many cases, the government offices
that a citizen would need to visit in order to exercise his rights would
be located in his or her own state, necessitating freedom of movement
within states.
In Corfield v. Coryell, Justice Washington identified freedom of
movement as a liberty enjoyed by citizens of all free governments.'"
Further, he noted, and perhaps assumed, that the right to "pass
through, or to reside in any other state" was a right already enjoyed
by citizens "in the several states.""47 One of the purposes of Article
IV, Section 2 was to grant constitutional protection to citizens
attempting to exercise that right across state borders." Article IV,
Section 2 did not, however, protect freedom of movement to citizens
within their own states because it did not prohibit states from
abridging the privileges and immunities of their own state citizens.
Furthermore, as previously noted, prior to the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the authority to protect the fundamental
rights of citizens belonged to the state governments. By incorporating
the fundamental rights articulated by Justice Washington into the
Fourteenth Amendment, however, the Framers extended federal
protection over those rights within the states. In doing so, the
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause conferred
federal protection over the right of free movement within the states
and prohibited states from abridging the movement of citizens within
state borders.
The conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment extended federal
protection over intrastate travel is further supported by historical
evidence. After emancipation, the Southern states attempted through
discriminatory legislation and private coercion to return the African-
American population to its former condition of servitude."a Southern
467. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, CJ.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
468. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35,44 (1867).
469. See, Chudy, supra note 406, at 567.
470. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
471. Id
472. Id.
473. Aremona G. Bennett, Phantom Freedom: Official Acceptance of Violence to
Personal Security And Subversion of Proprietary Rights and Ambitions Following
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states enacted Black Codes restricting the liberty of freed slaves, such
as their right to bear arms, to assemble and to hold worship services. 74
In addition, efforts were made to restrict the physical mobility of
African-Americans.4 75 Prior to the Civil War, "blacks had been
forbidden to travel without passes. '476 After the war, however, freed
African-Americans eagerly attemped to claim the right of free
movement. According to one commentator, "blacks took to the roads
with a notable enthusiasm. 'Right off colored folks started on the
move,' a former slave in Texas recalled. 'They seemed to want to get
closer to freedom, so they'd know what it was-like it was a place or a
city.' 47 7 According to David Bernstein, one of the purposes of the
Black Codes was to prevent a free labor market from developing.
478
For example, legislation which curtailed the mobility of African-
Americans also limited their economic freedom.479 For example, a
number of states passed vagrancy laws that penalized individuals who
had no fixed residence or employment.4 0 These laws effectively
restricted the movement of African-American workers, because
"traveling in search of a new job would leave them vulnerable to
arrest for vagrancy. ' 48 1  Even after the Civil Rights Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment invalidated the Black Codes, African-
Americans found their freedom restricted by facially-neutral
legislation.48 In addition, private violence was also used to curtail
migration by African-Americans.483
While most historical accounts of Reconstruction focus on Southern
oppression of African-Americans, the victims of these abuses also
included Northerners and Southern whites who had supported the
Union.4 4 These oppressive tactics practiced by the Southern states
included murder, physical abuse, enforced labor without
compensation, and denial of freedom of movement.48 5
Emancipation, 1865-1910, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 439, 453-57 (1994); David E.
Bernstein, The Law and Economics of Post-Civil War Restrictions on Interstate
Migration by African-Americans, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 781, 787 (1998).
474. Curtis, Resurrecting, supra note 3, at 30-31.
475. Id. at 31.
476. Randall Kennedy, Review Essay, Reconstruction and The Politics of
Scholarship Reconstruction, 98 Yale L.J. 521, 532 (1989) (reviewing and citing Eric
Foner, America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, at 80 (1988)).
477. Id.




482. Id. at 789-90.
483. Id. at 789 & n.42.
484. See Kaczorowski, Revolutionary, supra note 416, at 877; Robert J.
Kaczorowski, The Nationalization of Civil Rights: Constitutional Theory and Practice
in a Racist Society 1866-1883, at 27-28 (1987) [hereinafter Kaczorowski,
Nationalization]; see also Bennett, supra note 473, at 440.
485. Kaczorowski, Nationalization, supra note 484, at 28.
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It was in response to this social crisis that the Civil Rights Act and
its constitutional companion, the Fourteenth Amendment, were
passed.4 6  Congress intended to ensure that fundamental liberties
would be protected against abuse by the states. Since much of this
abuse took place -within the borders of the states, it was necessary to
provide citizens with enforceable rights against their own state
governments. Thus, the Privileges or Immunities Clause gave citizens
the right to exercise their fundamental right of free movement within
the borders of their states, in the same way that Article IV, Section 2
had given citizens the freedom to travel across the borders of a
state.487
CONCLUSION
The right to travel is a fundamental right identified by Justice
Washington in Corfield as a privilege or immunity of citizenship. This
right was granted federal protection against state abridgement by the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment who intended to protect
fundamental rights from state abridgement. Consequently, the right
to travel is guaranteed protection against state abridgement within the
borders of the state by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the states may not abridge the
right to intrastate travel.
Faced with the challenge of enunciating a lucid and principled
construction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Court may be
tempted to put the clause back in its grave. It is to be hoped that the
Court will finally take up the challenge to give the clause a meaningful
position in constitutional rights jurisprudence.
486. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary, supra note 416, at 877; see also Bennet, supra
note 473, at 457; Curtis, Resurrecting, supra note 3, at 32.
487. Most commentators who argue in favor of constitutional protection for the
right to travel ground their analysis in the doctrine of substantive due process. See
infra Part II. One reason for this preference may be that the due process rights are
protected against both federal and state infringement under the Fifth and the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clauses. It could be argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause does not restrain the
federal government's power to restrict intrastate travel. The Supreme Court has held,
however, that the federal government does not have the power to authorize states to
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 507-08 (1999). Nor
may the federal government itself violate the protections conferred by the Citizenship
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Thus, according to the Court, Congress
may not "validate a law that denies the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 508 (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan. 458 U.S. 718,
732-33 (1982)).
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